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Deng, Xiaoping China--Foreign policy Clear All

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Deng Xiaoping, 1979.

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Li, Xiannian

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July 5, 1994	The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China, Li Peng, on 4 July 1994 from 9.55 to 11.05 a.m. at the Federal Chancellery Kohl and Li Peng discuss human rights in China and the Chinese interpretation of the Tiananmen Square protests and massacre of 1989. Moreover, they review the relationship between the Vatican and China, German policy on Taiwan, China and GATT, China and the USA as well as EC trade restrictions vis-à-vis China.
June 12, 1989	China Division [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan], 'Our Country’s Future China Policy (Taking the Situation into Account)' Outline of Japan’s basic understanding of the situation in China in regards to the Tiananmen Square incident. The document discusses the ongoing approach to China, issues requiring specific examination, Japan-China bilateral economic relations, international diplomatic aspects, and points of consideration for future policy discussions.
June 1989	The Situation in China – Main Points of Minister’s Remarks at Japan – United States Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Highlights Japan’s ongoing understanding of the situation in China following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, Japan’s China policy, implications of U.S.-China relations to Japan, future China policy, and an explanation regarding Japan’s future economic cooperation with China.
June 1989	The Situation in China – Main Points of Minister’s Remarks at Japan-United States Foreign Ministers’ Meeting Main points of Japanese Minister’s remarks that took place at Japan-United States Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on the situation in China following the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. It answers key questions on Japan’s policy towards China on diplomacy and economic cooperation along with implications of a deterioration in U.S.-China relations following Tiananmen Square.
April 1984	Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Briefing Material for the President's Trip to China' Includes memoranda on "China's Independent Foreign Policy in Perspective," "The Foreign Policy Positions of China's Senior Leaders," "Deng-Zhao with Brzezinski--An Assessment," "Sino-Soviet Relations," "China and a Korean Dialogue," "Sino-Soviet Trade and Economic Relations," "China and Japan: Building for the Long Haul," "China's Taiwan Policy," "China-Southeast Asia," "China: Leadership and Succession," "China: Economic Reforms," "US-China Economic Relations," "China: Expanding Market for US Energy Firms," "China: Nuclear Power Prospects," and "China: Changes in Military Industrial Development Policy-Implications for the United States."
November 1982	National Intelligence Council Memorandum, 'China and Taiwan: Attitudes, Policies, and Options' The United States' interests in its relationships with China and Taiwan would be best served if Beijing and Taipei could reach some form of accommodation or association that would permit the two parts of China to coexist peacefully. The worst outcome would be a military confrontation that forced the United States to choose whether to provide .assistance to Taiwan or to allow it to be overwhelmed by superior Chinese force. Trends over the past four years have moved fitfully toward an eventual accommodation, and they probably will continue in this direction.
September 7, 1982	Memorandum from the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Talking Points for Your Meetings with Secretary's Shultz and Weinberger' The National Intelligence Officer for East Asia briefs the Director of Central Intelligence on China and Taiwan policy for an upcoming meeting with the secretaries of state and defense.
March 27, 1981	Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, 'Deng Xiaoping and the Taiwan Question' The CIA evaluates Deng Xiaoping's views on Taiwan and how we will likely calibrate PRC policy toward the island.
June 1981	Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, 'China's Views of Relations with the New US Administration: An Intelligence Assessment' A CIA assessment of Chinese views of the United States and areas of both alignment and divergence with US policy and interests.
December 15, 1980	Resolution on the Status and Mission of Combatting Enemy’s Ideological Sabotage Efforts During This New Period This resolution on combatting “ideological sabotage” lumps Chinese ideological propaganda, Western propaganda operations, international human rights and humanitarian relief activities, and religious radio broadcasts and religious missionary activities all together with the spreading influence of Western culture and music in Vietnam as part of a vast, insidious effort by Vietnam’s enemies designed to corrupt Vietnam’s society and to weaken its “revolutionary” spirit in order to cause the overthrow or collapse of the Vietnamese Communist Party and government. The over-the-top rhetoric used in this resolution illustrates the widespread paranoia that infected the upper ranks of Vietnam’s Party and security apparatus during this period of the Cold War. It was not until six years later, in December 1986, that the pressures of growing internal dissension (even within the Party), the country’s desperate economic situation, and reductions in Soviet military and economic to Vietnam resulted in the decision by the Communist Party’s 6th Party Congress to shift to a policy of reforms, called “Renovation” [Đổi Mới] reforms and to new Vietnamese efforts to normalize relations with China and the United States.