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Documents

November 1982

National Intelligence Council Memorandum, 'China and Taiwan: Attitudes, Policies, and Options'

The United States' interests in its relationships with China and Taiwan would be best served if Beijing and Taipei could reach some form of accommodation or association that would permit the two parts of China to coexist peacefully. The worst outcome would be a military confrontation that forced the United States to choose whether to provide .assistance to Taiwan or to allow it to be overwhelmed by superior Chinese force. Trends over the past four years have moved fitfully toward an eventual accommodation, and they probably will continue in this direction.

June 28, 1974

Central Intelligence Agency, Weekly Review Special Report, 'Nationalist China Revisited'

A CIA memorandum evaluating the domestic politics and international relations of Taiwan in 1974. 

This version of "Nationalist China Revisited" was declassified by the CIA on September 25, 1999. An alternate version was declassified on September 28, 2004. The release from 1999 includes fewer redactions than the version declassified five-years later.

June 28, 1974

Central Intelligence Agency, Weekly Review Special Report, 'Nationalist China Revisited'

A CIA memorandum evaluating the domestic politics and international relations of Taiwan in 1974. 

This version of "Nationalist China Revisited" was declassified by the CIA on September 28, 2004. An alternate version was declassified on September 25, 1999. The release from 1999 includes fewer redactions than the version declassified five-years later.

March 26, 1980

Memorandum by the China Policy Support Center, 'Further Chinese Statements on Taiwan's Membership in the INF'

A memo outlining the PRC position on Taiwan's participation in the International Monetary Fund. The memo concludes that "China is unlikely to withdraw its stated demand that Taiwan be expelled from the IMF."

September 7, 1982

Memorandum from the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Talking Points for Your Meetings with Secretary's Shultz and Weinberger'

The National Intelligence Officer for East Asia briefs the Director of Central Intelligence on China and Taiwan policy for an upcoming meeting with the secretaries of state and defense.

March 27, 1981

Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, 'Deng Xiaoping and the Taiwan Question'

The CIA evaluates Deng Xiaoping's views on Taiwan and how we will likely calibrate PRC policy toward the island.

August 17, 1982

The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President [Ronald Reagan], August 17, 1982, 7:00 am EDT

Following the conclusion of a joint communique with the PRC, President Reagan makes a statement on US policy towards Taiwan.

June 1981

Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, 'China's Views of Relations with the New US Administration: An Intelligence Assessment'

A CIA assessment of Chinese views of the United States and areas of both alignment and divergence with US policy and interests.

August 5, 1957

Record of Conversation of N.S. Khrushchev with Vice President of the “Japan-USSR” Friendship Society Kazami Akira

Kazami and Khrushchev discuss the development of Soviet-Japanese relations and Japanese independence. Kazami inquires about the possible participation of Japanese specialist in the industrial development of Siberia. He also asks about the potential transfer of the Kuril Islands to Japan. 

December 15, 1980

Resolution on the Status and Mission of Combatting Enemy’s Ideological Sabotage Efforts During This New Period

This resolution on combatting “ideological sabotage” lumps Chinese ideological propaganda, Western propaganda operations, international human rights and humanitarian relief activities, and religious radio broadcasts and religious missionary activities all together with the spreading influence of Western culture and music in Vietnam as part of a vast, insidious effort by Vietnam’s enemies designed to corrupt Vietnam’s society and to weaken its “revolutionary” spirit in order to cause the overthrow or collapse of the Vietnamese Communist Party and government. 

The over-the-top rhetoric used in this resolution illustrates the widespread paranoia that infected the upper ranks of Vietnam’s Party and security apparatus during this period of the Cold War.  It was not until six years later, in December 1986, that the pressures of growing internal dissension (even within the Party), the country’s desperate economic situation, and reductions in Soviet military and economic to Vietnam resulted in the decision by the Communist Party’s 6th Party Congress to shift to a policy of reforms, called “Renovation” [Đổi Mới] reforms and to new Vietnamese efforts to normalize relations with China and the United States.

Pagination