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Documents

March 27, 1952

National Intelligence Estimate Number 27/1, 'Chinese Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to Taiwan through 1952'

The CIA predicts that, as long as US support to Taiwan remains constant, the PRC cannot stage a successful attack on the island.

March 16, 1955

National Intelligence Estimate Number 100-4-55, 'Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan through 1955, and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan'

The CIA on whether the PRC has the ability to seize Taiwan and/or the offshore islands.

March 11, 1964

National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-64, 'Prospects for the Government of the Republic of China'

The CIA assesses Taiwan's future in the wake of France's normalization of diplomatic relations with the PRC. The report covers US-Republic of China relations and likely developments in Taiwan's internal security, politics, and international recognition.

June 20, 1961

National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-61, 'Prospects for the Government of the Republic of China'

This National Intelligence Estimate about the future of the Republic of China assesses the status of the China debate at the United Nations, KMT efforts to retake the mainland, the political status of local Taiwanese in the ROC, and other political and diplomatic issues.

August 27, 1957

Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-2-57, 'The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China'

Analysts at the CIA write that "the National Government remains politically stable and the economy of Taiwan continues gradually to improve. The military establishment is growing stronger, but Nationalist forces alone could not defend their territories against a full-scale Chinese Communist attack."

April 9, 1957

Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-57, 'Likelihood of Military Action by the Government of the Republic of China'

Analysts at the CIA conclude that "the Chinese Nationalists are very unlikely to launch an invasion or, in the absence of Chinese Communist provocation, to initiate ether major military action against the mainland in the next year or so."

October 9, 1956

National Intelligence Estimate Number 43-56, 'The Prospects of the Government of the Republic of China'

This National Intelligence Estimate concludes that "the Government of the Republic of China continues to exercise firm political control on Taiwan. With US assistance, an expanding economy has been maintained and the strength of the armed forces has been increased. At the same time, however, the international position of the National Government has declined, causing an increased feeling of insecurity and concern for the future."

August 29, 1958

Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Morale on the Major Offshore Islands and on Taiwan'

A report on the situation on Quemoy (Jinmen), Matsu (Mazu), and Taiwan and US support for the Republic of China (Taiwan).

September 10, 1954

Special National Intelligence Estimate Number 100-4/1-54: The Situation with Respect to the Nationalist Occupied Islands off the Coast of Mainland China

A CIA appraisal of Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions towards the off-shore islands occupied by the Chinese Nationalists, possible US courses of action, and the consequences of a successful Communist attack on the islands.

July 7, 1977

Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski for the Director of Central Intelligence, 'Intelligence Estimate on Reaction to Normalization of Relations with the People's Republic of China'

Brzezinski outlines the conditions under which the Carter administration would move to recognize the PRC. They include both that the US would cease to recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan, but that the people of Taiwan would still be able to live in peace and maintain a prosperous economy.

Pagination