Soviet guidance to its ambassador in Havana on the establishment of a Latin American nuclear free zone. Soviet concerns are voiced about the possibility of the treaty impeding on the transit of nuclear weapons in large areas of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

In response to requests from the President of Angola, José Eduardo dos Santos, the CC CPSU agrees to supply arms which will be sent from the Soviet Union to the Republic of Cuba, and then provided during the withdrawal of Cuban troops from the People’s Republic of Angola.

Anatoly Dobrynin was the head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Jorge Risquet was Castro’s point man for Angola.

Jorge Risquet was Castro’s point man for Angola; Anatoly Dobrynin was the head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The General Secretary of the Communist Party of Bolivia, Mario Monje, informs Chestnoy about a recent meeting with Che Guevara, in which they discuss the differences in Chinese Communist leadership policies. Guevara states that if forced to choose between the two sides, Cuban leadership would be on the side of the Soviet Union.

The Presidium decides to adopt Protocol 32.

UN Representative Milko Tarabanov reported to the Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo recent developments of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The report summarizes the conference's work from November 1962-December 1962, the period following the Cuban Missile Crisis. Tarabanov reports that Western powers put forward two draft agreements calling for the cessation of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, and underground--the proposals were debated during the 17th United Nations session.

The Cubam Missile Crisis occurred during the conference's session. Main issues discussed after Cuban Missile Crisis included: suspension of nuclear tests, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's proposal at the 17th session of the UN, ways to measure nuclear weapons testing, and military alliances (NATO).

Tarabanov also addresses the inter workings of conference members--Western, socialist, and neutral--including disagreements among Western powers. In summary Tarabanov adds that the prospect for cessation of nuclear tests is poor, but notes that the US may consider closing military bases, though not under pressure of the Soviet Union or neutral countries.

In response to President Kennedy's letter protesting the placement of missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev proposes a resolution to the crisis. When the time seemed right he would offer to dismantle the missiles already on the island (the MRBMs or R-12s) if Kennedy pledged not to invade Cuba.

Alexei Adzhubei, Khrushchev’s son-in-law and the editor-in-chief of Izvestia, reports on his meetings with US journalists and officials in Washington, DC. Especially significant was his 30 January meeting with President John F. Kennedy in which Kennedy compared the communist revolution in Cuba with the 1956 Hungarian Revolution suppressed by the Soviet Union. Adzhubei also described Kennedy's comments on German reunification.

Protocol 71 gives details to the immediate fallout of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Soviet perspective. Thanks to Castro’s so-called Armageddon letter and his five points, by December 1962 (date of this protocol), Khrushchev was calling the Cubans “unreliable allies.”