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Documents

May 12, 1963

Telegram from the Indian Ambassador to Mexico, 'Cuba After the Crisis'

The ambassador describes the domestic situation in Cuba and what it is like in Havana specifically in detail. He recounts a meeting with Foreign Minister Raul Roa.

January 18, 1962

Note to the GPRA Minister of Foreign Affairs, ‘Mission to Cuba'

Report from Lakhdar Brahimi -- GPRA representative at celebration of Cuban revolution in Havana -- on meeting with Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, both of whom express considerable interest in Algerian revolution. Fidel Castro pledges Cuban support, both material and diplomatic, advises Algeria on how to proceed in negotiations with France, and strongly encourages the opening of an Algerian diplomatic mission in Cuba. Brahimi concludes with recommendations on how best to respond to Cuban suggestions and an outline of potential strategic benefits from a diplomatic relationship between two countries.

March 20, 1965

Minutes of Conversation between Cuban Defense Minister Raúl Castro and Polish Leader Władysław Gomułka, Warsaw, 20 March 1965

During his visit in Poland, Castro relates Cuba's position on a conversation taken place in Moscow and why it may be of interest to the Cubans. Gomulka raises the issue of the missiles. In Gomulka's opinion two factors were decisive: contradictions which arose within the socialist camp and the policy which was conducted by Khrushchev. Gomulka is assured that US is capable of conducting a war with Cuba by way of conventional weapons, it does not have to use nuclear weapons. It is clear that the socialist camp and the USSR cannot defend Cuba in any other way but by using nuclear weapons. If a conflict is meant to be, then it will be a nuclear conflict, there is no other way. Gomulka further raises a question whether to go into a nuclear war or not. Castro disagrees with a manner nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Cuba by Soviets. Khruchshev explained that he did not have time. Per Gomulka, Khrushchev conducted a policy which was not thought-out and which was all-out. Gomulka further discusses his talks with Chinese and Vietnamese comrades re: nuclear weapons issue.

February 25, 1964

Foreign Ministry Report on Bulgarian-Cuban Cultural Relations

Deputy Minister Gero Grozev advises the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Committee for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries on cultural relations with Cuba. Based on the current political situation Grozev argues that Bulgaria should postpone developing a cultural center in Havana.

November 12, 1962

Bulgarian Embassy, Havana (Hubenov), to Bulgarian Foreign Ministry

In a letter from the Bulgarian Embassy to Cuba to the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Chief of Mission Hubenov writes that confidential archives of the embassy were destroyed at the order of Ambassador Konstantin Michev. Two protocols and a list of demolished materials are referenced in the letter, but not included.

January 11, 1967

Cooperation between the Czechoslovak and Cuban Intelligence Services

The report introduces Czechoslovak's assistance in the Operation MANUEL after the isolation of socialist Castro regime. Cuba looked for alternative routes in Europe in order to promote and influence the revolutionary movement in Latin America. Czechoslovakia assistance in the operation is of a strictly technical nature and its intelligence service is doing its utmost to protect the interests of the country by securing all technical matters. The report says that terminating the assistance was not possible for both practical and political reasons-- all direct flights between Czechoslovakia and Cuba would be suspended and a drastic cooling off of relations between two governments. Czechoslovak's refusal in assisting the operation would be interpreted as a political decision to suspend assistance to the national liberation movement in Latin America countries. However, the reports says that the assistance of Czechoslovak intelligence service to the operation is in no way amounts to agreeing with its political content and constitutes a minor aspect of intelligence work. The Soviet intelligence was also involved in organizing the operation in Moscow and offered assistance to its Cuban counterpart.