In this memo, the Soviet Ambassador to India is urged to meet with the leadership of the Indian Communist Party (Rao and Dange) and inform them, in light of the 22nd UN General Assembly session discussing the NPT, of the Soviet stance on the Treaty. The ambassador is instructed to emphasize the importance of nuclear non-proliferation for international geopolitical reasons, including preventing West Germany and China from acquiring nuclear weapons, as well as increasing domestic prosperity by using the atom for peaceful means. The ambassador is told to emphasize efforts of the USSR to prepare the draft treaty in collaboration with non-nuclear countries, as well as security guarantees in place for non-nuclear countries so that the Indian government greets the Treaty with understanding.

Manescu reports on the discussions of the government delegation of the PRR with the CPSU and Soviet State leaders on 23 October 1962. They discuss mostly relations with Southeast Asian countries.

Materials provided by former KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin to CWIHP, following the publication of the Working Paper No. 40, "The KGB in Afghanistan." As with all Mitrokhin’s notes, his compilation on Soviet “active measures” in South and Southwest Asia is based on other smuggled-out notes and was prepared especially for CWIHP. Please read the Notes on Sources for information on the nature and limitations of these documents.

The two leaders talk about Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the situation in Europe.

Conversation between Stalin and Zhou Enlai focusing on the Korean War. They discussed the exchange of POWs (and the Mexican proposal), peace negotiations, Chinese cooperation with India and Burma, and the creation of regional organizations. They also mentioned Germany (reunification), the situation/reforms in Xinjiang, Taiwan and Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), and military aid.

Five days after India's 1974 nuclear test, the Hungarian Embassy in New Delhi reports that the Indian government was grateful that the socialist countries had not confronted India on its nuclear explosion.

An extended Hungarian Foreign Ministry memorandum explicating the development of India's policy on nuclear arms and disarmament from the 1960s as well as a discussion on the reasons that the socialist countries--including Hungary--have chosen not to condemn India for its May 1974 nuclear explosion.