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November 16, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 9 p.m., Friday

A report from Roberto de Oliveira Campos on how certain actions and diplomatic moves during the Cuban crisis have served to inflame international tensions on both sides.

November 10, 1962

Telegram-Letter from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 10-13 November 1962

In conversation with a high officials from the State Department about the prospects of the Cuban situation, three hypotheses about the future Soviet comportment are discussed: 1) abandon entirely the government of Fidel Castro to its own fate; 2) limit itself to leave constituted in Cuba a socialist regime, based on a well-structured communist party and endowed with a repressive political machine, as a political base of propaganda and infiltration in Latin America and 3) to intensify Soviet technical and economic assistance in a manner to transform Cuba into a living demonstration of the efficacy of communism as an instrument of economic development in Latin America. The letter goes on to describe these three points in more detail.

October 31, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 6:30 p.m., Wednesday

The Brazilian government offers elements of their Armed Forces for collaboration in the blockade of Cuba, authorized by the OAS and executed by the American government. Brazil does so for three reasons: their affirmative vote on the blockade in the OAS, most Latin American countries have contributed armed forces and it is a gesture of cooperate with the United States.

October 29, 1962

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 1:30 p.m., Monday

Secretary of State Dean Rusk tells Brazilian officials about letters that have been sent between Kennedy and Khrushchev discussing missile bases in both Cuba and Turkey.

October 26, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), Noon, Friday

Campos offers an analytical review of the latest events in the Cuban Crisis, which has led him to some conclusions, including the goals of the United States government (to block new offensive arms from arriving in Cuba and to obtain the dismantling or removal of the present warlike installations).

October 24, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 5 p.m., Wednesday

A telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington suggesting that the inspection of Cuban territory should be transfered from the U.S. to an international group.

October 23, 1962

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 7 p.m. Tuesday

A report of the meeting between OAS officials and the descisions that were made regarding the Cuban crisis. Secretary Martin puts forward that, soon, there will be fully disseminated, to convince Latin American public opinion of the gravity of the threat, photographs of the remote-controlled missiles in Cuba.

October 23, 1962

Telegram from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 1 p.m., Tuesday

Suggestion for a decision to internationalize the Cuban crisis would permit Cuba and the Soviet Union to "save face", diminishing the dangerous possibility of direct confrontation.

October 23, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos)

A report on Secretary of State Dean Rusk's discussion of the severity of the American reaction to the installation of remote-controlled missiles of medium and intermediate range in Cuba by the Soviet Union.

October 22, 1962

Telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos)

A report from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington, D.C. about several meetings and consultations between the principal members and organs of the government (Kennedy, Johnson, etc.), especially of the Department of State and the Pentagon.Campos believes that an elaborate decision of great significance is in progress and that this decision may refer to Berlin or to Cuba or to the situation of the conflict between India and China.