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November 30, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 30 November 1962

Drozniak reports on a conversation he had with Mikoyan about some diplomatic actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis between the Soviet Union, the United States and Cuba.

November 16, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 16 November 1962

There is a belief within the US administration that Mikoyan was not successful in convincing Fidel Castro to adopt a Soviet point of view.

November 3, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 3 November 1962

Drozniak reports on the information from several sources on the Cuban Missile Crisis, particularly the White House and State Department's reactions to the agreement to dismantle the Soviet missiles in Cuba and the continued trouble they are having with Castro's refusal to allow UN inspections.

October 31, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington, 31 October 1962

Arthur Schlesinger, advisor to President Kennedy, confirms Drozniak's previous telegram report that " In [Schlesinger's] opinion, the assessment of the Soviet installation of the missiles in Cuba as the attempt to strengthen the [world] position of the USSR before a possible confrontation over Berlin, ended up prevailing within the US administration."

October 26, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 26 October 1962

According to Drozniak, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk has allegedly reported that the latest statements of journalists claiming the relaxation of tensions in the Cuban Missile Crisis do not correspond to the reality of serious tensions between the US and USSR.

October 23, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 23 October 1962

In a conversation with Charles Bartlett (a journalist who had befriended President Kennedy), Drozniak learns more of the Cuban Crisis situation and of US-USSR relations, including that the steps taken to address the crisis (the quarentine of Cuba) were implemented by Kennedy in the atmosphere of great pressure from the public opinion.

October 20, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak)

Drozniak compiles information he has collected from US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs William R. Tyler and US Ambassador at Large Llewellyn E. Thompson on the rising Cuban situation and US-USSR relations.

October 18, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 18 October 1962

Drozniak forwards a report from US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs [Edwin M.] Martin. Martin says that the Americans are well-informed of the military situation in Cuba, that Cuba does not possess nuclear weapons (nor will they be likely to because the USSR did not give such weapons to China, so why would they give them to Cuba?), that the level of the Cuban economy is twenty-five percent lower than the period before Fidel Castro came to power and Cuba is much more economically dependent on the USSR, and finally that any military invasion or complete blockade of Cuba would be considered an act of war by the USSR.

October 18, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 18 October 1962

Drozniak discusses the possibility of US military action against Cuba, as well as Cuba's foreign relations with the USSR and the US.

June 1, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 1 June 1962

Drozniak replies to Ogrodzinski regarding the information he received from from [Charles E. “Chip”] Bohlen that Cuba has been removed from the list of priorities of US foreign policy. Bohlen also confirms, through Drozniak, that the content of the talks between [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk and [Soviet Ambassador Anatoly] Dobrynin. The Americans are assessing that the USSR is not currently in any hurry to resolve the issue of Berlin. When it comes to a next meeting [between the Americans and the Soviets], the US will wait for a Soviet initiative.

Pagination