Da Cunha reports that the Soviet press (and government) has hidden from its readers the recent evolution of the Cuban problem/crisis.

The tight secrecy continues to surround the conversations with Anastas Mikoyan, however in a conversation with Pinto, he reveals information concerning: Fidel Castro, Cuban-Soviet relations during the crisis and Cuba's refusal to submit to international inspections.

In conversation with a high officials from the State Department about the prospects of the Cuban situation, three hypotheses about the future Soviet comportment are discussed: 1) abandon entirely the government of Fidel Castro to its own fate; 2) limit itself to leave constituted in Cuba a socialist regime, based on a well-structured communist party and endowed with a repressive political machine, as a political base of propaganda and infiltration in Latin America and 3) to intensify Soviet technical and economic assistance in a manner to transform Cuba into a living demonstration of the efficacy of communism as an instrument of economic development in Latin America. The letter goes on to describe these three points in more detail.

A description of how the American blockade against Cuba has hurt its production, shipping and foreign commerce capabilities. And according to this telegram, the damage that the Cuban economy is suffering is turning this country still more dependent on Soviet help in the immediate future.

Pinto describes his conversation with the Cuban Minister of External Relations, Raúl Roa, which he says confirmed his impressions that the Cuban government, conscious of the gravity of the situation, is disposed to make concessions to reach a minimal guarantee.

Pinto meets with Anastas Mikoyan and Fidel Castro to discuss Brazilian-Soviet-Cuban relations.

Pinto relays the message that Mikoyan intends to remain in Cuba at least one week, permiting a complete review of relations between Cuba and Russia, in face of the last events.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk tells Brazilian officials about letters that have been sent between Kennedy and Khrushchev discussing missile bases in both Cuba and Turkey.

Pinto describes a meeting with Roa in which Roa repeats a message from Fidel Castro's proclamation that the evacuation of the American base Guantanamo should be directed at not only the United States, but also the Soviet Union, to show both that Cuba is not a toy of the great powers and should be heard in the coming negotiations.

A memorandum on the Cuban Missile Crisis covering perspectives from the three major actors: U.S., Soviet Union and Cuba.