Vidaković reports to the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry on the diplomatic efforts of many Cuban officials (Roa, Dorticos, etc.). Vidakovic is worried they might not be approaching the situation (the Cuban Missile Crisis) with the appropriate fervor, which might, he believes, lead to a hysterical over-reaction at some point.

Vidaković describes the positions of both Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos, with whom he met, and U Thant, who sent him a message. Both men relay the difficulties in dealing with the Cuban situation, especially concerning the resolution to the UN on inspections in Cuba and the imminent danger of a possible American attack.

Ambassador Vidaković describes a meeting with Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos. Dorticos is convinced that the American attack and invasion will happen later that night.

A report on a meeting between the ambassador of Yugoslavia [Boško Vidaković] with President [Osvaldo] Dorticós to discuss American planes making low-level flights over Cuba and, according to information received recently (at the time), the American attack being imminent.

Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos says in a meeting with Afonso Arinos de Mello-Franco that Cuba does not desire to be armed more than it has to for defense. They also discuss United States interference in Cuban affairs.

A telegram from the Brazilian Embassy in Cuba describing the speech of Cuban President Dorticós, in the UN, as extremely ponderous and even conservative, by Cuban standards. Dorticos alluded at length to the North-American threats against Cuba, evidencing therefore, one more time, the “complex of invasion” that has motivated in large measures the comportment of the revolutionary government in international politics. Dorticos affirmed, moreover, that Cuba desires a “policy of peace and of coexistence” with all countries of the Continent, within an “absolute respect to the principle of non-intervention.”

A message from Mexican President Adolfo López Mateos to Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos. President Mateos expresses his concern with the possibility of weapons of aggression existing in Cuba. President Mateos hopes Cuba has not yet acquired these weapons, but that if it in fact has, he says that Mexico hopes "those bases are not used in any form whatsoever and the offensive weapons are withdrawn from Cuban territory."

Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós and Chinese Ambassador to Cuba Shen Jian discuss a wide range of topics, from The Selected Works of Mao Zedong to China's economic situation to American military interventions.

The telegram bears on the circumstances surrounding Fidel Castro's controversial 27 October letter to Khrushchev. Alekseev describes Castro's demeanor as being irritated and paranoid at the time of writing the letter. He provides background on Castro's actions and attitudes at the peak of the crisis, and especially his nocturnal visit to the Soviet embassy and preparation of his letter to Khrushchev on the night of 26-27 October. He advises Moscow on how to handle the Cuban leader, and offers analysis into the emotions and overall mood of Castro and his associates at that moment in the crisis.

Mikoyan, Castro and the Cuban leadership firther discuss the Soviet Union’s lack of regard for the Cubans during the missile crisis and the nature of UN inspections.