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1992

Saddam Hussein and other officials discussing Ba'th Party support to its Lebanese branch, its ideology, and other Party affairs

This 93 minute audio file dated 1992 shows on a meeting chaired by the Iraqi President with the National Command of the Ba'th Party. They discussed the following topics: ‐Dispatching Iraqi Ba‐thists to Lebanon to support the Lebanese Ba'th party there. ‐ Edification of the people in southern and northern Iraq over the Party's principles. ‐The mechanism of defending the Iraqi sovereignty from the Kurdish, and Iranian enemies. ‐ Ba'th party affairs. ‐The role of the Iraqi media during the 1st Gulf war. ‐ Research centers and their impact on the development of the Iraqi individual. ‐The foreign propaganda and media attacks on the country. ‐ Reviving the national intellect. ‐ The Ba'th party ideology. ‐ controlling the treason acts in southern and northern Iraq. (Translator's Comment: from 01:15:59 till 01:33:37 are blank.)

1990

National Command Meeting with Saddam Hussein

This file contains a National Command meeting presided over by Saddam Hussein. The attendees discuss the Baath party and its role in national development, the relationship between the Arab countries and Europe, and the international balance of power following the Cold War.

November 5, 1990

Cable No. 360 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Consul-General in Pretoria, 'ANC Deputy President Mandela’s Visit to Japan (Meeting with Prime Minister Kaifu)'

Prime Minister Kaifu and Nelson Mandela met on October 29, 1990. Kaifu praised Mandela's perseverance and the positive political change ongoing in South Africa. Mandela elaborates on developments in his country and requests $25 million dollars in financial support from Japan for the African National Congress. Kaifu declines, saying it would be difficult for Japan to give support to a political party. Mandela expresses his frustration that Japan, a "prosperous country," will not support South Africa.

September 23, 1961

Letter, William Rayman to Richard Reuter, Executive Director of the Cooperative for American Remittances Everywhere (CARE)

William Rayman’s letter to Richard Reuter not only reflects the swiftness with which CARE established its presence in Sierra Leone but also showcases its ability to tailor programs to align with the desires of several stakeholders. 

December 5, 1961

Report from Seán Ronan to Con Cremin (Dublin), ‘Irish Resolution on Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons’ (Confidential), New York [Excerpt]

Aiken drafted in additional personnel to the Irish Mission to the UN in the run-in to the XVIth UN Session. Seán Ronan, the head of the political and information divisions at headquarters in Dublin, was sent as a delegate to the First Committee of the UN, involving him intensely in Aiken’s non-dissemination efforts. His insider account reveals some of the dynamics and calculations at play in the building, as Ireland managed a balancing act of engineering consensus between East and West. In large part, the Irish Mission crafted the resolution’s language to skirt the issue of alliance nuclear sharing in a bid to manufacture unanimity. The Irish had pondered co-sponsoring a Swedish draft resolution but anticipated that it would face resistance from NATO comparable to earlier iterations of the Irish resolution. Similarly, Ireland neglected to mention a proposed new disarmament committee in the draft resolution – there was no guarantee that it would form and report expeditiously. Finally, by drawing on the instrument of acclamation, the Irish sidestepped French objections and gained universal approval for Resolution 1665 (1961), wrapping the resolution in universal legitimacy. 

1985

Table of Contents: 'Papers of the Higher School of the KGB,' Volume 36, Moscow, 1985, 480 pp.

The table of contents for volume 36 of Papers of the Higher School of the KGB. Articles relate to the 27th Congress of the CPSU, the 40th anniversary of the end of World War II, counterintelligence activities, intelligence bodies in West Germany and developing countries, and other subjects.

April 1, 1949

Letter, Jawaharlal Nehru to All Provincial Premiers

Nehru briefs the Provincial Premiers about internal and external developments. Nehru highlights the situation in China and states that the communists could soon take power in the whole of China. He speculates how this will affect other regions.

March 14, 1961

Memorandum to All Missions by the Department of External Affairs, ‘Arms Control’ (Confidential) (408/264B), Dublin

The arrival of the new U.S. president, John F. Kennedy, in office in 1961 encouraged Aiken to redouble his efforts. He searched for signs of change in the Kennedy administration. He was nevertheless guarded,  appreciating that the arms control ambitions of the United States did not necessarily or completely align with Ireland’s disarmament aspirations. He understood that progress required educating public opinion to recognize that general and complete disarmament could, given the vested interests, take generations. A step-by-step, gradualist approach therefore had to be adopted. He reiterated his philosophy of expanding areas of law, adopting a regionalist approach, and assuming a preventive orientation in a commentary on the Kennedy’s article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in November 1960, which was itself based on Kennedy's campaign speech earlier that year.

July 7, 1959

Dáil Éireann Debate, Tuesday 7 July 1959, Committee on Finance - Vote 59--External Affairs [Excerpt]

New Taoiseach Seán Lemass took the unusual step of intervening in a Foreign Affairs debate in July 1959 to defend Frank Aiken’s conduct at the United Nations. Trenchant critics on the opposition benches in the Fine Gael party had berated Aiken repeatedly since 1957. Critics inside and outside of the lower house of parliament (Dáil Éireann) asserted that Ireland, “a tiny country” with limited interests, had no right to voice an opinion on global matters which was more appropriately dealt with by the “Great Powers.” Worse, Aiken’s interventions would create enemies among Irish friends worldwide, most notably in the United Sstates. The tenor of the arguments was that Ireland had no nuclear energy industry and no nuclear weapons aspirations, so such matters should be left to the nuclear powers. It is difficult to avoid the sense that elements in Irish political life appreciated that American and NATO nuclear forces informally protected the anti-communist Republic of Ireland. Lemass ended speculation that he was less of a supporter of Aiken than his predecessor, de Valera. He affirmed that Ireland had a significant contribution to make to the global commons in terms of reinforcing peace and order. Aiken was empowered to continue.

July 14, 1959

Notice from First Secretary Eoin MacWhite To All Irish Diplomatic Missions (Except Washington)

First Secretary Eoin MacWhite informed all missions of Aiken’s concerns that U.S. nuclear information agreements with selected NATO partners could impede efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He was nonetheless reticent when it came to lodging a formal protest, having been advised by Eoin MacWhite’s that a strong denunciation would be counterproductive. From MacWhite’s reading no actual nuclear information would be transferred to Allied personnel after all. The agreements related specifically to information necessary for the training of Allied personnel in the employment of U.S. atomic weapons in their hosts’ territories, so Aiken recoiled from further diplomatic protests. He appreciated the need to maintain some nuance on nuclear sharing as he pursued an East-West consensus. 

The strength of NATO's feelings in favor of enhanced alliance nuclear defense and cooperation in the aftermath of the Sputnik shock was well known. The Irish were aware of the Eastern bloc’s objections to NATO nuclear sharing as a dangerous precedent that strengthened NATO’s political and security position. Moscow was especially exercised by any prospect of West German access to nuclear weapons as part of the normalization of German rearmament and progress toward reunification. Moscow opposed any semblance of Bonn’s finger on the nuclear trigger, or its troops gaining proficiency with nuclear weaponry. 

Pagination