Aiken made an immediate impression on his arrival in the Twelfth Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1957. He adopted an impartial posture of assessing each issue on its merits and campaigning to remodel international politics around self-determination, humanitarianism, and peace. His exhortation was that only the UN had the moral authority and political legitimacy to put forward global solutions. While he did not propose nuclear disarmament measures specifically, his intent was signaled by his recommendation for a mutual drawback of foreign forces (including their nuclear weapons) in central Europe and his endorsement of a proposal to discuss the representation of China in the United Nations. The Eisenhower administration was hostile to Aiken’s course as outlined in the U.S. ambassador’s audience with Taoiseach Eamon de Valera and Aiken in Dublin on 2 October. The record underlines the Irish concerns about accidental nuclear war due to the proximity of opposing U.S. and Soviet forces in central Europe.  

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 25 July 1990 describes the latest developments in Iraq, Kuwait, Liberia, the Soviet Union, China, Taiwan, European Community, Hungary and Germany.

A report on the discussions which occurred at a meeting of the Atlantic Council, during which the relative military powers of the Soviet Block and Western Block were compared. The different positions and threats posed to various NATO nations were also discussed. Finally, the report laid out plans for nuclear, submarine, and aerial weapons development to ensure that the Soviet Block’s military power never exceeds that of the Western block.

Letter expressing Germany’s opinion that the defense of Europe is impossible without using nuclear weapons as an intimidation tactic and horror at the United States’ suggestion that Europe can defend itself with conventional weapons alone. Defense of Germany should be NATO’s top priority because if Germany falls, the rest of Europe falls. The letter also references NATO’s difficulty in developing a cohesive strategy because each country is too concerned with protecting its own territories and assets.

An official at the American Embassy in Bonn discusses the North Korean smuggling scandals in Scandinavia, suggests possible connections between the scandals and North Korean Embassies elsewhere in Europe, and confirms the absence of North Korean smuggling in the Federal Republic of Germany.

W.A. Harriman and Stalin discuss post-war peace treaties and discuss who will be invited to participate in negotiations in the European war.

This report, issued after the seventh Interkit meeting in Budapest, addresses unsolved socio-economic problems and internal party disputes in China. The new military strategy of the People's Republic as well as its economic development are examined. Beijing's foreign relations with Western countries, especially with the US, are considered to be detrimental to international détente. The attendees condemn China for stockpiling nuclear weapons and missiles in preparation for a military confrontation with the Soviet Union, for extending its influence in developing countries, for strengthening the position of NATO, for interfering with the domestic policies of Vietnam, and for supporting the military junta in Chile.

George F. Kennan writes to the Secretary of State with a lengthy analysis of Soviet policy in an attempt to explain their recent uncooperative behavior. This message would later become famous as the "long telegram."

In this folder Mitrokhin expresses the KGB’s concerns regarding the potential for Yuri Orlov’s nomination for a Nobel Prize. Orlov was well known in the Soviet Union for his dissident activities and for organizing the Moscow Helsinki Group to monitor Soviet adherence to the 1975 Helsinki Accords. According to Mitrokhin, he openly supported all anti-soviet groups and organized public protests for the Soviet human rights movement. As the KGB was concerned, they made many efforts to take the movement under control, but these did not lead to success. Mitrokhin provides examples of the KGB’s attempts to stop Orlov’s activism.

Mitrokhin states that the West, however, was in extreme support of Orlov’s ideology. In order to help his movement to gain more influence, Western officials nominated Orlov for the Nobel Prize in 1978. The KGB immediately developed a complex plan to assure Nobel officials that Orlov did not deserve the prize and that it would have been unfavorable for the prestige of the Nobel Prize if Orlov was awarded it. Mitrokhin states that KGB chief Yuri Andropov took control over the operation because Orlov winning the prize would have been crucially harmful for the Soviet political system. Mitrokhin provides the detailed plan in this entry.

A KGB resident in Oslo sent an urgent telegram to Moscow on October 27, 1978 stating that Anwar El Sadat and Menachem Begin became laureates of the Nobel Peace prize. Mitrokhin provides full telegram text in this entry and also states that the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed his satisfaction with the fact that Orlov did not win the prize because it would have negatively affected relations between the two countries.

A lengthy document that addresses several issues related to Communism and China. It covers such topics as Chinese foreign policy, Chinese and American relations, Maoism, Chinese policy regarding developing countries, capitalist countries and other socialist countries.