This document is a memo from Christopher Mallaby at the FCO's Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to Robert Alston at the Joint Nuclear Unit. In it, Mallaby discusses a prior memo from Alston, as well as a meeting they both had with an official from the US State Department, Thomas Pickering, three days prior.

Norman Wulf sent Armacost a proposal for applying nonproliferation standards to Palistan even if Reagan rejected application of the Solarz amendment and aid continued.

Secretary Shultz had recommended that Washington “now certify” that Pakistan “does not possess a nuclear device” (as required by the Pressler amendment).

Adelman advised Armacost to “increase pressure on Pakistan to try to get them to stop enrichment above five percent and to stop illegal procurement activities in the United States.”

Wulf reported to Adelman that the information telegram on the Pervez and other smuggling cases had gone out to the embassies (except for Soviet bloc) and had received a favorable response from nuclear-supplier states.

Norman Wulf reviewed plans for a “dialogue” with Pakistan to prevent illegal procurement in the United States and verification of the five percent enrichment commitment.

A hearing by the House subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade on 22 July 1987 made it clear why administration officials worried about the implications of the Pervez case. With Congressman Solarz arguing that the arrest involved “a flagrant and provocative challenge to US nonproliferation objectives.”

With Pakistan already violating the “red line” on uranium enrichment, Adelman believed that without a display of resolve “presidential credibility” would be further damaged; that required cutting off aid under the Solarz amendment.

ACDA official Norman Wulf saw a good case, with the information supporting positive answers to basic questions: would the maraging steel to be used for nuclear weapons manufacture, was the Pakistani national working on behalf of his government, would the steel “contribute significantly” to a capability to manufacture a nuclear explosive, and was there an “attempted illegal export”?

When ACDA director Kenneth Adelman saw the State Department talking points for a conversation with Pakistani ambassador Jamsheed Marker about the Pervez case he was irritated by the “business-as-usual” tone.