On July 2, 1957, US senator John F. Kennedy made his perhaps best-known senatorial speech—on Algeria.

Home to about 8 million Muslims, 1.2 million European settlers, and 130,000 Jews, it was from October 1954 embroiled in what France dubbed “events”—domestic events, to be precise. Virtually all settlers and most metropolitan French saw Algeria as an indivisible part of France. Algeria had been integrated into metropolitan administrative structures in 1847, towards the end of a structurally if not intentionally genocidal pacification campaign; Algeria’s population dropped by half between 1830, when France invaded, and the early 1870s. Eighty years and many political turns later (see e.g. Messali Hadj’s 1927 speech in this collection), in 1954, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) launched a war for independence. Kennedy did not quite see eye to eye with the FLN.

As Kennedy's speech shows, he did not want France entirely out of North Africa. However, he had criticized French action already in early 1950s Indochina. And in 1957 he met with Abdelkader Chanderli (1915-1993), an unaccredited representative of the FLN at the United Nations in New York and in Washington, DC, and a linchpin of the FLN’s successful international offensive described in Matthew Connelly’s A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (2002). Thus, Kennedy supported the FLN’s demand for independence, which explains its very positive reaction to his speech.

And thus, unlike the 1952-1960 Republican administration of Dwight Eisenhower (1890-1969) that officially backed the views of NATO ally France and kept delivering arms, the Democratic senator diagnosed a “war” by “Western imperialism” that, together with if different from “Soviet imperialism,” is “the great enemy of … the most powerful single force in the world today: ... man's eternal desire to be free and independent.” (In fact, Kennedy’s speech on the Algerian example of Western imperialism was the first of two, the second concerning the Polish example of Sovietimperialism. On another, domestic note, to support African Algeria’s independence was an attempt to woe civil-rights-movement-era African Americans without enraging white voters.) To be sure, Kennedy saw France as an ally, too. But France’s war was tainting Washington too much, which helped Moscow. In Kennedy’s eyes, to support the US Cold War against the Soviet Union meant granting Algeria independence. The official French line was the exact opposite: only continued French presence in Algeria could keep Moscow and its Egyptian puppet, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, from controlling the Mediterranean and encroaching on Africa.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 2 February 1990 describes the latest developments in German unification, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Arab States, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union.

In this telegram, V. Zorin discusses Chinese economic relations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. China has sent instructions to recall economic and political advisors from the DRV, but the Soviet Ambassador to the DRV has determined that economic assistance is still needed.

Telegram from K. Novikov discusses proposals regarding questions by Pham Van Dong. Proposals regarding travel of Hoan Van Hoan, Ho Van Lo and others to Delhi for conference; the provision of ships for transporting Democratic Republic of Vietnam forces from southern zone to northern zone of Vietnam; the dispatch of a Soviet military advisor group to Vietnam; and assistance to Vietnamese for drafting a plan to fulfill economic needs of the DRV.

Instructions outlining topics of discussion for an upcoming meeting between Soviet officials and Democratic Republic of Vietnam leader Ho Chi Minh. Main topics of discussion in the first section include the Geneva agreements, relations with France, counteracting US plans in Indo-China, Laos and Cambodia, the United National Front, land reform, and the evacuation of Catholics to South Vietnam. Discussion points on DVR-Soviet Union relations include economic and technical assistance, trade, shipments to the Vietnamese People’s Army, the provision of credit, training DRV specialists in the USSR, advisors and Russian language teachers, military, and the Joint Communiqué.

Choi Duk Shin offers his views on the crises in Hungary and the Middle East, urges President Rhee to organize immediate action against communist countries, and reports on Vietnamese domestic affairs including the recent typhoon and the continued Chinese minority debate.

The meeting was among leaders from China, Vietnam, North Korea and Albania in 1964. They discussed Soviet-Romanian relations and plans to support Romania.

Memorandum of a conversation with Yuri Andropov. He and Boleslaw Jaszczuk discuss Chinese influence military and economic influence in Vietnam, as well as Vietnam's opinion on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Finally he notes the poor communications technology in place in Southeast Asia.

Mao Zedong and Kissinger's meeting was aimed at establishing political relations between China and the United States. They discussed the following issues: U.S.-Chinese cooperation, the differences in ideology, Western German policy towards the Soviet Union, the amount of American overseas troops, the Vietnam War, trade barriers between two nations, Chinese-Japanese relations, and the historical issues between Germany and Britain during WWII.