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Documents

January 1964

Information of the Bulgarian Embassy in Havana Regarding the Situation in Cuba in 1963

The Bulgarian Embassy in Havana reports to the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on political, economic, and cultural developments in Cuba circa 1963. Cuba is politically united, but is experiencing economic hardship after the “Caribbean Crisis” primarily because of the US embargo. In the report, embassy staff reviews developments between socialist countries and Cuba throughout 1963. Some examples include communist aid to Cuba after Hurricane Flora and Cuba’s stance on Sino-Soviet relations. Bulgaria’s show of solidarity resulted in concrete political, economic, and cultural cooperation. Embassy staff notes the drawbacks and benefits of Bulgaria’s relationship with Cuba.

October 18, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 18 October 1962

Drozniak forwards a report from US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs [Edwin M.] Martin. Martin says that the Americans are well-informed of the military situation in Cuba, that Cuba does not possess nuclear weapons (nor will they be likely to because the USSR did not give such weapons to China, so why would they give them to Cuba?), that the level of the Cuban economy is twenty-five percent lower than the period before Fidel Castro came to power and Cuba is much more economically dependent on the USSR, and finally that any military invasion or complete blockade of Cuba would be considered an act of war by the USSR.

November 10, 1962

Telegram-Letter from Brazilian Embassy in Washington (Campos), 10-13 November 1962

In conversation with a high officials from the State Department about the prospects of the Cuban situation, three hypotheses about the future Soviet comportment are discussed: 1) abandon entirely the government of Fidel Castro to its own fate; 2) limit itself to leave constituted in Cuba a socialist regime, based on a well-structured communist party and endowed with a repressive political machine, as a political base of propaganda and infiltration in Latin America and 3) to intensify Soviet technical and economic assistance in a manner to transform Cuba into a living demonstration of the efficacy of communism as an instrument of economic development in Latin America. The letter goes on to describe these three points in more detail.

July 12, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 41

Protocol 41 details a meeting on a group of economic advisers sent to Cuba from the Soviet Union.