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Documents

March 31, 1984

KGB Report on New Elements in US Policy toward the European Socialist Countries

Information from the KGB shared with the Stasi about a high-level review of US policy by the Department of State. Presidential Directive [NS-NSDD] 54 from [September] 1982 made the main US objective to subvert Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.

June 2007

KGB Practices. Folder 70. The Chekist Anthology.

This entry contains brief descriptions of a variety of KGB operations carried out between the early 1960’s and late 1970’s, and provides a sampling of the kinds of operations that were common in that era. Operation “Grom” [“Thunder”] involved fabricating a US State Department memo on Soviet citizens’ inclination towards treason. The memo discussed ways in which the US could exploit this tendency to its advantage. It was published on the front page of the British newspaper “Daily Express.” A pamphlet created by the KGB and attributed to the terrorist organization ‘BAS’ (South Tyrolean Liberation Committee) was introduced as evidence in the trial of BAS leader Norbert Burger in Austria. In July 1976 the KGB residency in Singapore spied on Chess Grandmaster Boris Spassky during his visit to Singapore, and noted in its report that he spent much of his free time on the tennis court. The KGB created and disseminated a letter, ostensibly from nationalist Ukrainian emigrants, protesting the French government’s cooperation with Zionists, and threatening reprisals against French Zionists. The KGB residency in Austria organized operation “Bonga” [“Bigwig”] in which forged letters from Chairman Mao were produced. These letters indicated that Mao himself had essentially organized the opposition to Hua Guofeng’s reforms, and that Hua might lead China to a revisionist course. In March 1977, the newspaper of the Austrian Communist Party printed a translation of a secret Chilean document in which the Chilean secret police asked Gen. Augusto Pinochet for additional funds to carry out undercover operations abroad. Pinochet’s reply contained a harsh rebuke for the request, and a strong admonishment against engaging in clandestine operations abroad. Mitrokhin did not mention where the document came from, nor did he state whether it was authentic or a forgery.

June 2007

Counter-Intelligence Protection, 1971. Folder 97. The Chekist Anthology.

Information on KGB counter-intelligence surveillance of Soviet tourists vacationing in other socialist countries who had contact with foreigners. The document states that Western intelligence services organized “friendship meetings” through tourist firms to meet Soviet citizens, gauge their loyalty to the USSR, and obtain political, economic, and military intelligence. KGB counter-intelligence paid particular attention to Soviet citizens who were absent from their groups, took side trips to different cities or regions, made telephone calls to foreigners, or engaged in “ideologically harmful” conversations in the presence of foreigners. Mirokhin regrets that the KGB underestimated the strengths and methodology of Western intelligence services. He concludes that the KGB should have adopted some of the same methods, and targeted Western tourists visiting socialist countries.

October 23, 1981

Cooperative Agreement between the Interior Ministry of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Soviet KGB for the summer of 1981 - 1985

The two parties consent to assist each other in the surveillance of goods going between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union, letters going between the two countries and from them to capitalist countries, correspondence sent from Czechoslovak or Soviet citizens to people who recently arrived from capitalist countries, the mailing of anti-socialist materials sent through the two nations and mail involving anti-socialist propaganda sent to either country from capitalist countries. Both parties also agree to exchange information on ways subversives use the post to their advantage and how each country’s officials monitor post suspected of containing ideologically injurious material.

December 8, 1978

Cooperative plan between the Interior Ministry of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the KGB of the Soviet Union from the summer of 1979-1981

The parties agree to assist one another in the collection of intelligence information on political, economic, scientific and technical matters and exchange information on suspicious contacts of Czechoslovak and Soviet citizens suspected to be spies or subversive. Both agree to the exchange of counter-intelligence regarding Czechoslovak and Soviet citizens working in scientific organizations and international exhibitions, fairs and congresses. Steps are outlined to protect railroad cargo using troops from Warsaw Pact states, prevent eavesdropping of telecommunications and detect and prevent foreign terrorist attacks on Czechoslovak and Soviet airplanes and anti-socialist interruption of international trucking lines. Special mention is made of multiple international transportation organizations that need to be monitored. Information-sharing procedures are agreed to for commercial and industrial firms, banks, scientific centers and international scientific organizations.

March 22, 1979

Protocol on cooperation between the Interior Ministries of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union for the year 1979

The two parties agree to worker, including Interior Ministry officials and university students, exchanges in the field of academia, law, politics, criminal investigation, fire-fighting, engineering, external relations, science and public safety. Provisions are made of the exchange of documents relating to criminology, public safety, the Soviet military, politics and fire-fighting techniques. Both parties agree to exchange information on thefts of shipments, detection and prevention of anti-state activity in border regions and the protection of public order.

October 25, 1985

Cooperative plan between the Interior Ministry of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Soviet KGB for the summer of 1986-1990

This agreement acknowledges the alleged use of post as a method used by subversives to act against the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union. Both parties agree to exchange information after evaluating the effectiveness of their work in this area and plan to prolong the existing cooperative agreement.

June 2007

Coordination of Soviet and Czechoslovak Intelligence Operations. Folder 80. The Chekist Anthology.

This folder consists of a detailed operational plan for cooperation between the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB for the years 1975-1978. Specific objectives include penetrating the military, political, and economic establishments of the United States, Britain, West Germany, France, and NATO, impeding the activities of the Czech Congress of National Development (KNR), collecting information on “Zionist intrigues,” gathering scientific/technical information on Western achievements in the fields of biological, chemical, and thermonuclear weapons, and using active measures to curtail the activities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in West Germany.

November 17, 1967

Operation MANUEL: Origins, Development and Aims

Comrade Josef Houska submits a document concerning issues related to cooperation with the Cuban intelligence service especially the Operation MANUEL to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Operational MANUEL started in 1962 when the Cuban intelligence asked the Czechoslovak resident in Havana to arrange a transit through Prague for Venezuelan nationals who underwent guerrilla training in Cuba. In 1964 talks were held between Cuban and Czechoslovak intelligence services but no formal agreement of the tasks and responsibilities was concluded between the two. The Soviet government was informed about the Operation MANUEL and stated its agreement with the project. Houska says that the main objective of the operation is the education and training of revolutionary cadres from Latin America and the organization of combat groups. Participants of the operation were not confined to cadres from among the ranks of communist parties but also included members from various nationalist and anti-American groupings. The routes of individual participants in the operation were determined by the Cuban intelligence service who mainly directed the Operation MANUEL. Houska says problems that arisen in the course of the operation were solved in collaboration with Cuban and the Soviet authorities. The document cautioned about counter-espionage institutions' increasing interests in the operation and the fact that the US intelligence service agents were among the operation participants. Houska says refusal to offer assistance would have a negative impact on Cuba and Czechoslovakia would lose control over the operation.

March 7, 1975

Plan on joint counter-intelligence measures between the KGB and Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior from summer 1975 until 1977

This agreement outlines cooperation on security issues concerning hostile ideological centers, emigrant groups and anti-socialist, anti-Soviet, revisionist and nationalist groups. Also discussed in detail are ecclesiastical organizations, the alteration of informational and occupational gatherings between the two countries and scientific, cultural and students exchanges.

Pagination