Skip to content

Results:

1 - 10 of 16

Documents

June 19, 1953

National Security Council Report, NSC 158, 'United States Objectives and Actions to Exploit the Unrest in the Satellite States'

Recommendations adopted by the National Security Council at the suggestion of the Psychological Strategy Board on covert actions to be undertaken in the Soviet Satellite States. Authorized by the National Security Council, NSC 158 envisaged aggressive psychological warfare to exploit and heighten the unrest behind the Iron Curtain. The policy was endorsed by President Eisenhower on June 26, 1953.

March 31, 1984

KGB Report on New Elements in US Policy toward the European Socialist Countries

Information from the KGB shared with the Stasi about a high-level review of US policy by the Department of State. Presidential Directive [NS-NSDD] 54 from [September] 1982 made the main US objective to subvert Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.

September 19, 1983

Note about the Talks of Comrade Minister [Erich Mielke] with the Deputy Chairman of the KGB, Comrade V. A. Kryuchkov, on 19 September 1983 in Berlin

Meeting between KGB Deputy Chairman Kryuchkov and East German Minister for State Security Mielke, including discussion of the shootdown of Korean Airlines (KAL) Flight 007.

July 11, 1981

Stasi Note on Meeting Between Minister Mielke and KGB Chairman Andropov

KGB Chairman Andropov and East German Minister for State Security Mielke meet to discuss ongoing Stasi/KGB cooperation and international affairs. Topics of conversation include the Ronald Reagan administration, the Polish Solidarity Crisis,

March 29, 1978

Protocol Guiding Cooperation between the Stasi and the KGB, 1978

Agreement between the Stasi and KGB outlining the placement of KGB liaison officers and their responsibilities, as well as granting the KGB the right to recruit East German citizens for intelligence work.

December 6, 1973

Agreement on Cooperation between the Stasi and the KGB, 6 December 1973

1973 agreement between the Stasi and the KGB outlining their cooperative efforts to fight "ideological subversion" and uncover "the hostile plans of the enemy." Both secret services would also exchange information gathered by their espionage activities and provide mutual support in infiltrating agents. Of particular mutual interest was espionage against the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin. To this end, the KGB was permitted to recruit East German citizens, and the MfS would secure their ongoing contacts.

November 13, 1969

Stasi Note on Meeting with KGB Officials, 13 November 1969

Meeting between KGB First Deputy S. K. Zvigun (Tsvigun) and East German Minister for State Security Mielke. They discuss anti-Soviet "ideological subversion" on the part of the United States and other enemies, as well as Soviet dissidents such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Andrei Sakharov.

December 2, 1964

Stasi Report on Meetings with the KGB, 30 November-1 December 1964

Meetings between KGB Chairman Semichastny and East German Minister for State Security Mielke. Topics of discussion include Lyndon B. Johnson's recent election in the United States, Khrushchev's ouster from the Kremlin, Sino-Soviet relation, and Khrushchev's son-in-law Alexei Adzhubei.

June 2007

KGB Practices. Folder 70. The Chekist Anthology.

This entry contains brief descriptions of a variety of KGB operations carried out between the early 1960’s and late 1970’s, and provides a sampling of the kinds of operations that were common in that era. Operation “Grom” [“Thunder”] involved fabricating a US State Department memo on Soviet citizens’ inclination towards treason. The memo discussed ways in which the US could exploit this tendency to its advantage. It was published on the front page of the British newspaper “Daily Express.” A pamphlet created by the KGB and attributed to the terrorist organization ‘BAS’ (South Tyrolean Liberation Committee) was introduced as evidence in the trial of BAS leader Norbert Burger in Austria. In July 1976 the KGB residency in Singapore spied on Chess Grandmaster Boris Spassky during his visit to Singapore, and noted in its report that he spent much of his free time on the tennis court. The KGB created and disseminated a letter, ostensibly from nationalist Ukrainian emigrants, protesting the French government’s cooperation with Zionists, and threatening reprisals against French Zionists. The KGB residency in Austria organized operation “Bonga” [“Bigwig”] in which forged letters from Chairman Mao were produced. These letters indicated that Mao himself had essentially organized the opposition to Hua Guofeng’s reforms, and that Hua might lead China to a revisionist course. In March 1977, the newspaper of the Austrian Communist Party printed a translation of a secret Chilean document in which the Chilean secret police asked Gen. Augusto Pinochet for additional funds to carry out undercover operations abroad. Pinochet’s reply contained a harsh rebuke for the request, and a strong admonishment against engaging in clandestine operations abroad. Mitrokhin did not mention where the document came from, nor did he state whether it was authentic or a forgery.

June 2007

On Human Rights. Folder 51. The Chekist Anthology.

Outlines the KGB’s response to the USSR’s signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975. The accords obligated signatories to respect their citizens’ human rights. This gave Soviet dissidents and westerners leverage in demanding that the USSR end persecution on the basis of religious or political beliefs.

Some of the KGB’s active measures included the establishment of a charitable fund dedicated to helping victims of imperialism and capitalism, and the fabrication of a letter from a Ukrainian group to FRG President Walter Scheel describing human rights violations in West Germany. The document also mentions that the Soviet Ministry of Defense obtained an outline of the various European powers’ positions on human rights issues as presented at the March 1977 meeting of the European Economic Community in London from the Italian Foreign Ministry.

The KGB also initiated Operation “Raskol” [“Schism”], which ran between 1977 and 1980. This operation included active measures to discredit Soviet dissidents Andrei Sakharov, Yelena Bonner, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, measures designed to drive a wedge between the US and its democratic allies, and measures intended to convince the US government that continued support for the dissident movement did nothing to harm the position of the USSR.

Pagination