Transcript of meetings in Moscow between Romanian and Soviet officials. They discuss disagreements and divergences that have developed between the two parties.

List of the ultimately irreconcilable differences that had arisen in Soviet-Romanian relations under Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej by July 1964, in preparation for the upcoming discussions in Moscow. Topping the list of major problems were the “anti-Soviet atmosphere in Romania,” the “problem of Soviet citizens,” and the “maintenance of espionage networks” on Romanian territory.

Romanian and Chinese officials on the Soviet use of informal channels to interfere in Romania’s domestic affairs.

The Romanian Politburo discusses Soviet networks operating covertly on their territory and Khrushchev’s reaction when confronted over this issue. The Politburo intends to shut down those networks and reclaim the Romanian agents working in them.

Khrushchev, Kosygin, and Romanian representative Bodnăraş discuss the history of Soviet-Romanian relationships, Soviet espionage in Romania, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Delegates from Romania discuss the strained Soviet-Romanian relationship with Soviet officials. Issues raised include the organizational structure of the Warsaw Pact’s military forces, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon), and the existence of Soviet spies and espionage networks in Romania, the Soviet insistence that all Communist countries should support their proposals in international bodies and vote as a block, and other unilateral Soviet decisions such as placing missiles in Cuba in 1962.

Information from the KGB shared with the Stasi about a high-level review of US policy by the Department of State. Presidential Directive [NS-NSDD] 54 from [September] 1982 made the main US objective to subvert Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.

Information on KGB counter-intelligence surveillance of Soviet tourists vacationing in other socialist countries who had contact with foreigners. The document states that Western intelligence services organized “friendship meetings” through tourist firms to meet Soviet citizens, gauge their loyalty to the USSR, and obtain political, economic, and military intelligence. KGB counter-intelligence paid particular attention to Soviet citizens who were absent from their groups, took side trips to different cities or regions, made telephone calls to foreigners, or engaged in “ideologically harmful” conversations in the presence of foreigners. Mirokhin regrets that the KGB underestimated the strengths and methodology of Western intelligence services. He concludes that the KGB should have adopted some of the same methods, and targeted Western tourists visiting socialist countries.

This folder consists of a detailed operational plan for cooperation between the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB for the years 1975-1978. Specific objectives include penetrating the military, political, and economic establishments of the United States, Britain, West Germany, France, and NATO, impeding the activities of the Czech Congress of National Development (KNR), collecting information on “Zionist intrigues,” gathering scientific/technical information on Western achievements in the fields of biological, chemical, and thermonuclear weapons, and using active measures to curtail the activities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in West Germany.

In this folder Mitrokhin reports on some spy techniques used by the KGB in major western European cities (including Helsinki, Geneva, Bucharest) in 1975. According to Mitrokhin, the main tasks for KGB residents trained in the use of operational techniques were to check post offices for foreign correspondence, to secretly receive information about meetings of officials of a certain country, and to videotape any acts of anti-socialist movements. This note provides detailed statistics on the photographs taken of foreign mail, telephone recordings, and radio-intercepts. Mitrokhin specifically focuses on operations which took place in Vienna. As his note states, KGB agents photographed thousands of pages of secret materials using the “Zagadka,” a mini-camera built into a regular pen. The KGB residency had their own “TS” correspondence service with 98 N-line—undercover agents operated by legal residents—around Europe. Residents used microdot script and steganography —the art of writing hidden messages—for agents of N-line. As Mitrokhin states, X-line—residency subunit of scientific-technical investigation—agents’ tasks were to provide materials for secret operations. They built in a recording device in an ashtray, used the inside of an automobile seats to keep secret materials, and batteries for cameras. Mitrokhin also provides the exact number and names of all KGB residency agencies in Vienna in 1975, and describes security techniques used for their technology and agents.