Khrushchev, Kosygin, and Romanian representative Bodnăraş discuss the history of Soviet-Romanian relationships, Soviet espionage in Romania, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Delegates from Romania discuss the strained Soviet-Romanian relationship with Soviet officials. Issues raised include the organizational structure of the Warsaw Pact’s military forces, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or Comecon), and the existence of Soviet spies and espionage networks in Romania, the Soviet insistence that all Communist countries should support their proposals in international bodies and vote as a block, and other unilateral Soviet decisions such as placing missiles in Cuba in 1962.

Yearly report by KGB Chief Andropov to the CPSU leadership on the actions taken by the KGB in the field of espionage, counter-espionage, and counter-propaganda.

The parties agree to assist one another in the collection of intelligence information on political, economic, scientific and technical matters and exchange information on suspicious contacts of Czechoslovak and Soviet citizens suspected to be spies or subversive. Both agree to the exchange of counter-intelligence regarding Czechoslovak and Soviet citizens working in scientific organizations and international exhibitions, fairs and congresses. Steps are outlined to protect railroad cargo using troops from Warsaw Pact states, prevent eavesdropping of telecommunications and detect and prevent foreign terrorist attacks on Czechoslovak and Soviet airplanes and anti-socialist interruption of international trucking lines. Special mention is made of multiple international transportation organizations that need to be monitored. Information-sharing procedures are agreed to for commercial and industrial firms, banks, scientific centers and international scientific organizations.

This report deals with Operation "Arsenal." More specifically, it discusses the operation's discovery and seizure of weapons and explosive materials illegally kept by the population.

The two parties set forth their joint security strategy to manage perceived threats to state authority from the summer of 1978 through 1980. They agree to work with broadcast stations, including Radio Free Europe, to ensure they are not subversive stations and to use Czechoslovak students as agents against subversive radio stations. The parties highlight the importance of fighting Zionist and Trotskyist organizations, and make plans to cooperate to infiltrate organizations, including Jewish religious groups, that may have been infiltrated by these organizations. KGB and Czechoslovak security officials pledge to cooperate in monitoring and infiltrating international communist groups and reactionary church groups, including some associated with the Vatican, in order to detect and foil potential upcoming actions against the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and other socialist countries. Foreign religious groups active in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, such as Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh-day Adventists, are mentioned as potentially anti-state. Both parties agree to cooperate in order to frustrate attempts by anti-socialist parties in Czechoslovak to connect with anti-state dissidents in the Soviet Union and share information on new forms of fighting actions of anti-socialist individuals. To combat ideological diversion, the parties decide to promote scientific and cultural exchanges between the two countries. The Soviet and Czechoslovak delegates decide to implement counter-intelligence and anti-ideological diversion measures at prominent international events such as the 1980 Summer (Moscow) and Winter (Lake Placid) Olympic Games and international film festivals, exhibitions and fairs to be held in the Soviet Union. Both parties agree to monitor extremist and terrorist groups, youth organizations in East Germany, France, England and the United States and Kurdish students studying in Europe.