1893-1976
Eastern Europe
(372) documents
East Asia
North America
1893- 1976
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1931- 2022
1898- 1976
1879- 1953
May 9, 1963
Peng Zhen held a meeting with the Romanian Ambassador to China and gained new insights into the Soviet-Romanian relationship.
January 25, 1962
The Chinese Embassy in Bucharest reflects on Romania's foreign policy, Sino-Romanian relations, and domestic developments in Romania in 1961.
April 18, 1963
The Department of Soviet and Eastern European Affairs says that the Soviet Union and Romania are in conflict over CMEA, and reports on Romania's recent positions towards China, Albania, and Yugoslavia.
November 11, 1963
The Chinese Embassy in Romania evaluates Ion Gheorghe Maurer's article, "The Unshakeable Foundation of the Unity of the International Communist Movement."
November 22, 1963
The Chinese Foreign Ministry advises its diplomats "not to criticize Romania directly" despite indications that Ion Gheorghe Maurer is supporting the Soviet Union.
February 14, 1962
The Chinese Embassy reports that Romania's attitudes towards China continue to shift between hot and cold.
November 24, 1964
The Chinese Embassy in Bucharest reports on Romania's views of de-Stalinization, Albania, and China.
April 13, 1962
The Chinese Foreign Ministry provides instructions to the Embassy in Romania on how it should handle relations with Bucharest in the context of the Sino-Soviet split.
May 31, 1962
The Chinese Embassy in Romania offers its perspectives on Romania's policies towards China, India, Albania, Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom, and Austria.
July 14, 1959
First Secretary Eoin MacWhite informed all missions of Aikenâs concerns that U.S. nuclear information agreements with selected NATO partners could impede efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He was nonetheless reticent when it came to lodging a formal protest, having been advised by Eoin MacWhite that a strong denunciation would be counterproductive. From MacWhiteâs reading no actual nuclear information would be transferred to Allied personnel after all. The agreements related specifically to information necessary for the training of Allied personnel in the employment of U.S. atomic weapons in their hostsâ territories, so Aiken recoiled from further diplomatic protests. He appreciated the need to maintain some nuance on nuclear sharing as he pursued an East-West consensus. The strength of NATO's feelings in favor of enhanced alliance nuclear defense and cooperation in the aftermath of the Sputnik shock was well known. The Irish were aware of the Eastern blocâs objections to NATO nuclear sharing as a dangerous precedent that strengthened NATOâs political and security position. Moscow was especially exercised by any prospect of West German access to nuclear weapons as part of the normalization of German rearmament and progress toward reunification. Moscow opposed any semblance of Bonnâs finger on the nuclear trigger, or its troops gaining proficiency with nuclear weaponry.