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September 10, 1991

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with the President of the EC Commission, Jacques Delors, on Monday, 9 September 1991, 16:40 until 16:55 hours

Kohl and Delors examine the role of the European Community in the stabilization of the Soviet Union's economy including financial aid.

July 24, 1991

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with French President Mitterrand on 23 July 1991 in Bad Wiessee, 11:45 am to 1:30 pm

Kohl and Mitterrand debate essential issues of European security and the emergence of potential new security structures after the end of the Cold War such as a European pillar of NATO and the French-German brigade as the nucleus of a European security and defense policy.

July 4, 1991

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with the Secretary General of the United Nations Perez de Cuellar on Tuesday, 2 July 1991, in Bonn

Kohl and Perez de Cuellar discuss Germany's international role, European integration, the Yugoslavia War, the Middle East and the end of Perez de Cuellar's tenure as UN Secretary General.

June 13, 1991

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, Bonn, 13 June 1991, 11:45 am to 12:45 pm

Kohl and Mulroney look back into Canada's role as a supporter of German unification. Mulroney highlights the relevance of his personal diplomacy in this endeavor. In addition, they discuss financial aid for the Soviet Union and preparations for the London World Economic Summit.

June 10, 1991

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with British Prime Minister Major on Sunday, 9 June 1991, in Chequers

Kohl and Major examine the state of European integration. Britain's position in the EC, the Political Union as well as the Economic and Monetary Union. Moreover, they discuss the idea for the creation of a European policy force.

June 3, 1991

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with President Mitterrand on Thursday, 30 May 1991, in Lille (working breakfast)

Kohl and Mitterrand confer on NATO, European security and the idea of establishing a common security and defense policy under the roof of the European Community.

May 1, 1991

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez on May 1, 1991 in Lanzarote

Kohl and Gonzalez discuss the state of European integration and the situation in the Gulf. They review the preparations for the forthcoming European Council in Luxemburg arguing in favor of a step-by-step approach as the best way to achieve lasting results.

January 26, 1968

"Defence And Oversea Policy Committee: Non-Proliferation: Memorandum By The Minister Of State For Foreign Affairs "

Subsequent to De Gaulle's November 1967 veto of Wilson's EEC application, senior British ministers still saw the European question as having considerable importance. Shortly before his departure from the role of Foreign Secretary, George Brown reported to the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee that the ructions over Article 3 of the NPT would be "particularly awkward for us as potential members of EURATOM and the E.E.C." De Gaulle's second "Non!" only served to postpone Britain's membership of the EEC, as Edward Heath's Conservative government successfully campaigned for accession, which took place in 1973.

October 2, 1967

Letter from Derek Day (Foreign Office) to Michael Palliser (Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs to the Prime Minister)

Responding to a request from Michael Palliser (Wilson's Private Secretary for foreign affairs), the Foreign Office's seasoned Europe-watcher Derek Day argued that the government needed to balance three – sometimes conflicting – UK interests. First, there was the position as a European power, particularly with regard to the ongoing EEC application. Second, there was the UK's status as a nuclear power, in which the UK shared “special responsibilities” with the US, exemplified by the UK's acquisition of Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles as its primary nuclear deterrent. Third, there was the desire to see a non-proliferation treaty concluded, which sometimes meant disagreement with both the United States and the Soviet Union. Day contended that the United Kingdom seemed to have been successful in positioning itself as understanding European anxieties, with Bonn having congratulated Wilson's administration on bring “good Europeans.” Day's assessment was seen and lauded by Wilson, who hoped that it was correct.

September 21, 1967

Memorandum from George Brown to Harold Wilson

When the USSR and the USA submitted a draft non-proliferation treaty in the early autumn of 1967, British representatives were enthusiastically arguing that as a prospective member of EURATOM, any British position must axiomatically take account of European interests.  As the negotiations moved forward, though, Wilson's government found itself caught in a three-sided trap of its own devising: fearful of being labelled “bad Europeans,” anxious about being seen by Washington as “unreliable allies,” and concerned about Moscow viewing them as part of the “treacherous West.”  Balancing out these competing concerns was becoming foremost in the minds of senior ministers.

Pagination