Nonproliferation talks entered their decisive phase after the submission of a joint U.S.-Soviet draft to the ENDC on February 21, 1967. One week later, High-Commissioner of the French Commissariat à l’énergie atomique, Francis Perrin, assessed France’s options. It was not “by accident,” he noted, the original five UN Security Council permanent members—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and China—were in line for nuclear-club membership: “…they are the same profound reasons, of a geographical, demographic or other nature, which led to the choice [in 1945] … of the countries with special responsibilities in the maintenance of world peace.” After noting how advances in “India, Israel, Japan, Sweden, and also West Germany” portended the further spread of nuclear weapons—and acknowledging France had itself sought help with its weapon program—Perrin pondered whether proliferation might hasten nuclear disarmament by convincing the superpowers of its merits. In the end, however, fear of a “large and hostile” nuclear-armed PRC made him pessimistic. While he did not advise signing the NPT, it would be “very important” for France to affirm publicly, if unilaterally, “its constant policy since 1958 … not to cede any atomic weapon or any atomic explosive device to a country which does not possess it, and not to help any such country to manufacture them.” He dismissed internal opposition toward the NPT as defensive—"an a posteriori justification of the French decision to constitute an atomic armament." More significant was the likelihood West Germany would gain its own atomic arsenal, jeopardizing France’s “dominant political position among the Europe of the Six” members of the European Communities and reviving Cold War tensions in Europe. He finished with an eye-opening analysis of how the Kosygin proposal for nuclear-weapon states to extend negative security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon states’ signatory to the NPT would not impede the use of French nuclear armaments against a West German blitzkrieg backed by the United States.

This document includes council directives to the Commission for the negotiation of a Euratom verification agreement in accordance with Article III, 4, of the NPT.

This interview with M. Margulies describes the Euratom Treaty as a tangible manifestation of a desire for peace.

This note from the Euratom Commision details the possible construction of an isotope separation plant in the European Community.

This memo to the Council of Ministers from the Euratom Commission examines the Russian draft of Article III of the NPT. It draws attention to the gradual convergence of Russian and American positions on the control clauses of the Treaty.

This memo to the Euratom Commission detailed the reaction of the Council of Minister on the problems in the proposed non-proliferation treaty.

Checklist of topics covered in discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on Article III of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

This project served as a response to questions asked by the Committee of Permanent Representatives to the Council. It discusses the compatibility of the NPT project and the Euratom Treaty as well as modifications.

Lord Chalfont described the international agreement on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons as a new phase in negotiations on disarmament.

These notes from the Euratom Commission to the Council of Ministers discuss the inclusion of an agreement on nonproliferation and between the United States and the Soviet Union and the impact of oversight.