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1948

Preliminary Plan for Operational Invigilation against Rada Polonii Amerykańskiej

This is a counterintelligence report from 1948 (exact date not indicated) on operational actions taken against Rada Polonii Amerykańskiej (American Relief for Poland, or the ARP) in connection with the distribution of CARE packages in Poland. Although the Communists ruling Poland initially warmly welcomed support from foreign aid organizations, this changed in the late 1940s as Moscow placed trusted Communist leaders in power who were under pressure to reject contact with the West. The activities of CARE and other similar organizations began to be seen as unwanted foreign agents. CARE was treated with indifference, impatience, and finally, unconcealed hostility 

July 14, 1959

Notice from First Secretary Eoin MacWhite To All Irish Diplomatic Missions (Except Washington)

First Secretary Eoin MacWhite informed all missions of Aiken’s concerns that U.S. nuclear information agreements with selected NATO partners could impede efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He was nonetheless reticent when it came to lodging a formal protest, having been advised by Eoin MacWhite that a strong denunciation would be counterproductive. From MacWhite’s reading no actual nuclear information would be transferred to Allied personnel after all. The agreements related specifically to information necessary for the training of Allied personnel in the employment of U.S. atomic weapons in their hosts’ territories, so Aiken recoiled from further diplomatic protests. He appreciated the need to maintain some nuance on nuclear sharing as he pursued an East-West consensus. 

The strength of NATO's feelings in favor of enhanced alliance nuclear defense and cooperation in the aftermath of the Sputnik shock was well known. The Irish were aware of the Eastern bloc’s objections to NATO nuclear sharing as a dangerous precedent that strengthened NATO’s political and security position. Moscow was especially exercised by any prospect of West German access to nuclear weapons as part of the normalization of German rearmament and progress toward reunification. Moscow opposed any semblance of Bonn’s finger on the nuclear trigger, or its troops gaining proficiency with nuclear weaponry. 

June 26, 1959

Letter from Frederick H. Boland to Con Cremin (Dublin)

Boland gauged opinion at the UN and assisted in preparing the ground for Aiken’s campaign in the XIVth Session in the fall of 1959. Ireland cultivated the UN Secretariat, notably Dr. Protitch, who evaluated the Irish proposal as helpful. Likewise, intimations from the Eastern bloc were positive. The Irish Permanent Representative consolidated links with the second-in-command of the U.S. mission to the UN, James W. Barco, to enable a constructive dialogue with the Americans to fashion a resolution they could tolerate

November 20, 1958

Letter from Frederick H. Boland to Con Cremin (Dublin) (Private and Confidential), New York

The report of Ireland’s permanent representative to the United Nations to his superior, the secretary of the Department of External Affairs, delivers his account of Aiken’s first (failed) attempt to generate support for a resolution in the Thirteenth UN Session. Recognizing the breadth and depth of opposition, he withdrew his draft resolution and instead requested a simple roll call vote in favor of the second paragraph on 31 October – a modest statement acknowledging that an expansion in the number of nuclear weapons states would be harmful to peace and increase obstacles to disarmament. The measure passed with 37 votes and no opposition, although 44 abstentions were recorded. The Soviet bloc supported the maneuver, while Western-aligned countries abstained.  

September 19, 1958

Address by Mr. Frank Aiken to the United Nations General Assembly Official, 23th Session, 751st Plenary Meeting

Aiken’s landmark address to the plenary of the UN General Assembly on 19 September 1958 launched his non-proliferation campaign. It is the first time he publicly identified stopping the spread of nuclear weapons as a concrete step in the collective interest to unblock the disarmament impasse, preventing a runaway arms race among the powers of the Earth. It was clearly framed as part of his wider campaign for global governance based on the rule of law rather than the threat of force. For Aiken, the challenge was stabilizing the arms race and generating trust to construct a world order based on justice and law – “to preserve a Pax Atomica while we build a Pax Mundi.” This speech was a critical departure. The widespread positive reception encouraged Aiken, persuading him to draft a formal resolution.

October 2, 1957

Memorandum by Frank Aiken [on an Interview with Scott McCleod and the Taoiseach]

Aiken made an immediate impression on his arrival in the Twelfth Session of the UN General Assembly in September 1957. He adopted an impartial posture of assessing each issue on its merits and campaigning to remodel international politics around self-determination, humanitarianism, and peace. His exhortation was that only the UN had the moral authority and political legitimacy to put forward global solutions. While he did not propose nuclear disarmament measures specifically, his intent was signaled by his recommendation for a mutual drawback of foreign forces (including their nuclear weapons) in central Europe and his endorsement of a proposal to discuss the representation of China in the United Nations. The Eisenhower administration was hostile to Aiken’s course as outlined in the U.S. ambassador’s audience with Taoiseach Eamon de Valera and Aiken in Dublin on 2 October. The record underlines the Irish concerns about accidental nuclear war due to the proximity of opposing U.S. and Soviet forces in central Europe.  

July 5, 1994

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China, Li Peng, on 4 July 1994 from 9.55 to 11.05 a.m. at the Federal Chancellery

Kohl and Li Peng discuss human rights in China and the Chinese interpretation of the Tiananmen   Square protests and massacre of 1989. Moreover, they review the relationship between the Vatican and China, German policy on Taiwan, China and  GATT, China and the USA as well as EC trade restrictions vis-à-vis China.

February 18, 1994

Meeting between Head of Department 2 [Joachim Bitterlich] and Iranian Ambassador Mousavian on 17 February 1994

Bitterlich and Mousavian review the state of bilateral relations and the importance of debt rescheduling for Iran. Bitterlich requests a more constructive Iranian role in the search for peace in the Middle East. Both discuss schemes for regional security and the CSCE process as a role model for the establishment of new multilateral security institutions in the Middle East.

February 12, 1994

Cable, Secretary of State to US Office Berlin (Eyes Only for Ambassador Holbrooke), 'Memcon of Clinton-Kohl January 31 Lunch'

A U.S. summary of a meeting between Bill Clinton and Helmut Kohl.

February 3, 1994

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Lunch Meeting with President Clinton in Washington on 31 January 1994

Kohl and Clinton review the state of NATO enlargement after the January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels. They view NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) as the best solution to engage Russia and to reach out to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Both view the situation in Ukraine as a key factor in the search for Europe's post-Cold War order. "If anything happened in Ukraine, this would increase the pressure for the NATO accession of the Central and Eastern European countries," Clinton says.

Pagination