The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 25 July 1990 describes the latest developments in Iraq, Kuwait, Liberia, the Soviet Union, China, Taiwan, European Community, Hungary and Germany.

After A.I Mikoyan's trip to the United States and his conversations with senior US government leaders, the USSR MFA submitted a draft of confidential information to be sent to the heads of government of several states. The content of the instructions to be told to the foreign leaders includes discussion of the German problem and Berlin, the problem of disarmament and a halt to nuclear testing, the Near and Middle East, the Far East, and other issues.

U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger met Chairman Mao at his residence in Peking. The two argued about the importance of U.S.-Chinese relations in American politics. Mao repeats that the United States' concerns order America, the Soviet Union, Europe, Japan, and lastly China. Kissinger responds that the Soviet Union, as a superpower, is frequently dealt with, but in strategy China is a priority. Throughout the conversation, Mao continues to point out his old age and failing health. The leaders also discuss European unity, Japanese hegemony, German reunification, and the New York Times.

The conversation is concerning the "German question" in terms of the conditions and aftermath of the surrender. PR China sees the negotiation on Germany as becoming an agreement that might apply similar to the question on the Japanese surrender. For this reason Jing Tai asks Molotov to allow China to take part in the negotiations on Germany. The trials of Japanese war criminals were also discussed.

M. Jacques Roux describes and compares West German-East German relations and China-Taiwan relations, reporting that, as Beijing opens up with Western countries, it is concurrently demanding that they break relations with Taipei.

The text of the agreements reached at the Yalta (Crimea) Conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Stalin.

This analysis examines the intensification of Romanian-Chinese relations after 1971. The document explains why relations between Romania and China can pose problems. It discusses similarities between China's and Romania's domestic and foreign policies and relates these similarities to the nationalist course of the Romanian Communist Party. Romania supposedly sees a role for China within the UN as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union. The author disagrees with the Romanian position regarding German reunification and a European conference on security and cooperation.

This document is a demarche to be delivered to the Chinese ambassador in East Berlin on the occasion of China's establishment of diplomatic relations between West Germany and the People's Republic of China (PRC). The demarche says the West German government is pursuing a revisionist policy and does not accept the post-war separation of Germany. It assesses the role of Bonn in international relations as detrimental to the entire Socialist camp and regards the visit of West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel to Beijing, as well as diplomatic relations between China and West Germany, as damaging the interests of East Germany. The author asks China to reconsider this policy, with reference to East Berlin's support for the PRC's territorial claims to Taiwan/Formosa.

According to a marginal note, the demarche was never delivered.

In this memorandum to the Soviet Presidium, Foreign Minister Molotov proposes that the Soviet Union publicly state its willingness to consider joining NATO. He explains that the proposal is intended to disrupt the formation of the European Defense Community and the rearmament of West Germany, and also limit the United State's influence in Europe.

Their discussion involves the idea of a definite Soviet victory in Korea, the failure of US soldiers and President Truman, the internal politics of the US; internal politics of China, the progress of the decision about Germany among the Soviets as well as other Western powers.