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Documents

May 24, 1953

Sample Plan for the Draft Response to the Notes of the Three Powers

Unhappy with the call for a conference in Lugano, this plan outlines several points that should be taken into consideration when drafting the official response including the Soviet awareness that any lack of results from this conference would result in blame being placed on the Soviet state and the dismissal of questions raised by the Soviet government in prior correspondence. The Soviets conclude that they should arrange the program of the conference in order to maximize the conferences effectiveness in resolving lingering post-war problems.

May 5, 1953

Vladimir Semyonov, 'Memorandum on the German Question'

Memorandum on Soviet policy regarding German unification including meetings with the United States, England, and France on an All-German Conference and need for future discussion. Also addressed is Soviet relations with East Germany in the forms of military assistance and economic aid for reparations.

March 26, 1954

Molotov's Proposal that the USSR Join NATO, March 1954

In this memorandum to the Soviet Presidium, Foreign Minister Molotov proposes that the Soviet Union publicly state its willingness to consider joining NATO. He explains that the proposal is intended to disrupt the formation of the European Defense Community and the rearmament of West Germany, and also limit the United State's influence in Europe.

September 25, 1953

Draft Instructions to Chuikov and Semyonov

In March 1953, Moscow had declined Ulbricht’s request for tightening up the sector border in Berlin, then the major loophole in the SED leadership’s efforts to seal off East Germany. In the aftermath of the demonstrations and unrest in Berlin, the SED leadership apparently tried to reintroduce the idea of increased “border security” in Berlin. Eager to salvage whatever was left of its political position as a champion of German unity, Moscow again held such measures as politically “disadvantageous” and “unacceptable.” Certainly, the Kremlin was also aware of the continued widespread resentment among the Berlin and GDR population which made any more restrictive measures a risky undertaking. Instead, the Soviets urged the SED to increase its “fight against hostile elements” in West Berlin—an issue that would become more and more the focus of Soviet attitude on Berlin.

April 18, 1953

Memorandum from Ivan Turginov, 'On the Western Powers’ Policy regarding the German Question'

Ivan Turginov reports on the policies of the Western powers on the German Question. Special emphasis is given to the public opinion in western countries with regard to Western and Soviet policies towards occupied Germany.

April 28, 1953

Soviet Foreign Ministry Memorandum, 'Regarding Further Measures of the Soviet Government on the German Question'

Memorandum on further issues regarding the German Question. The memorandum discusses further actions to be taken by the Soviet leadership in order to respond to developments in the Western controlled sectors of Germany and to increase Soviet influence with the German people.

May 2, 1953

Memorandum from Vladimir Semyonov to Vyacheslav Molotov Evaluating the Prospects for a Successful Resolution of the German Question

Memorandum to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov on German reunification. The memorandum reviews the developments following the East German proposal of an "all German" conference and the Soviet proposal for a German peace treaty.

May 8, 1953

USSR Foreign Ministry Draft Memorandum, 'On Further Soviet Government Measures Pertaining to the German Question'

Memorandum from the Soviet Foreign Affairs Ministry on Soviet foreign policy options with regard to the German Question. The memorandum looks at the effects on Soviet policy toward the western powers in the context of the Postdam conference and at the future state of the Soviet-East German relations.

June 2, 1953

Speech by Georgii M. Malenkov to a visiting government delegation from the German Democratic Republic (GDR)

Malenkov discusses East and West Germany, arguing that failure to unify the two countries will lead to another world war. He argues that the "forced" building of socialism in East Germany is in fact an obstacle to reunification, proposing that a reunification will be possible "only on the basis that Germany will be a bourgeois-democratic republic."

August 28, 1962

Conversation of Cde. N. S. Khrushchev and acting United Nations Secretary General U Thant, 28 August 1962

Khrushchev and Thant discuss the possibility of a visit by Khrushchev to the UN General Assembly. Khrushchev says a visit is not likely until the Americans, French, British and Germans are ready to negotiate a solution to the Berlin question. Khrushchev outlines the Soviet position and says that the Soviet Union will sign a unilateral peace treaty with the GDR if their conditions are not met. He says that the SU would agree to UN intervention and to a multilateral peace treaty, which would avert international conflict and war. Khrushchev suggests that the UN headquarters be transferred to West Germany due to high costs and discrimination in New York. He identifies additional issues for discussion: the admittance of the People's Republic of China into the UN, the Taiwan-China issue, and disarmament. Thant and Khrushchev discuss the obstacles to resolution of the German question, including public opinion in America. They also discuss American dominance in the UN Secretariat, free trade, and the Common Market, among other topics.

Pagination