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April 19, 1993

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with French President Mitterrand on Monday, 19 April, 13.45-13.55 hours

Kohl and Mitterrand discuss NATO's surprising decision to call for Turkish fighter aircraft in the mission to control Bosnia-Hercegovina's airspace. Both criticize the fact that the decision was taken by the military without political consultations. Both Kohl and and Mitterrand believe that "this was to wrong way to bring back Turkey to the Balkans."

November 26, 1992

State Minister Schmidbauer's Meeting with an Islamic Parliamentary Delegation led by Prof. Erbakan (Turkey) on 24 November 1992 in the Chancellor’s Office

Schmidbauer and Erbakan discuss the situation of Muslims in Western countries and in Germany in particular against the background of rising xenophobia in unified Germany. Erbakan sees Germany as a good Western partner for Muslim countries.

March 12, 1991

The Chancellor’s [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with British Prime Minister Major (in the context of German-British consultations) on Monday, 11 March 1991, at the Chancellor’s Office

Kohl and Major review ideas about the establishment of a European pillar in NATO and French plans for new security structures in Europe.

January 31, 1991

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd on 30 January 1991

Kohl and Hurd discuss Germany's financial aid in support of Britain's military operations in the Gulf in the amount of DM 800 million. Moreover, Kohl reviews his efforts for constitutional changes in order to enable Germany's participation in future of out-of-are missions.

January 31, 1991

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with the American President George Bush on 28 January 1991

Kohl and Bush review the situation in the Gulf and discuss Germany's financial contribution to the costs of the war. In terms of numbers, Bush has in mind one billion dollar as a contribution to the previous costs for the "desert shield" campaign and another five billion dollars to help cover the first three months of the war.

January 18, 1991

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Soviet Ambassador Terechov on 17 January 1991

On behalf of Gorbachev, Ambassador Terechov complains that the Soviet government was only informed about the start of U.S. military operations in the Persian Gulf an hour in advance.

December 27, 1990

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with the Turkish President Özal on Friday, 21 December 1990

Kohl and Özal debate the Gulf crisis and Turkey's request for the deployment of the air component of NATO's Allied Command Europe Mobile Force. In addition, they discuss the resignation of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

January 28, 1991

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation: Telcon with Chancellor Kohl of Germany, January 28, 1991, 11:08-11:28 a.m.

On a phone call, Bush and Kohl discuss the Gulf War, including the evacuation of Iraqi planes to Iran, Saddam Hussein's state of mind, the role of Turkey, and German's financial contribution.

July 25, 1923

Die äussere Politik der Woche (The Lausanne Peace Treaty)

By the late nineteenth century, Germany replaced Britain as the modern Ottoman Empire’s principal European partner. Hence, in 1914 it did not take the Ottoman government long to enter World War I at Germany‘s side, fighting Russia. After Germany‘s defeat, the new government in Berlin in June 1919 accepted the onerous Versailles Treaty. Declaring Germany and its allies the sole responsible parties for the war, it detached territories in Germany‘s east and west, imposed tremendous reparation payments, principally to France, and set strict limits to armed forces and military development (which however were soon bypassed by clandestine cooperation with the Soviets). In the postwar Ottoman Empire / nascent Turkey, developments differed—and were closely followed in Germany. From as early as 1919, especially conservative Germans saw Turkey’s action against the Allies as a model for their country, as Stefan Ihrig‘s Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination (2014) has shown.

A case in point is the text published here, in the elite conservative national daily Neue preussische Zeitung (also Kreuzzeitung), by Otto Hoetzsch (1876-1946), who in 1920-1930 served as a member of parliament for the Deutschnationale Volkspartei, the largest conservative party in the Weimarer Republic (1918-1933). To be sure, the Ottoman/Turkish postwar beginnings were as bleak as Germany‘s. In October 1918, the British-Ottoman Armistice of Mudros demobilized the army, evacuated all non-Anatolian garrisons, and stipulated the Allied occupation of Istanbul and the Straits. And in August 1920, the Treaty of Sèvres, signed by Sultan Mehmet VI but rejected by the subsequently disbanded parliament, affirmed Allied control of the Straits and Istanbul, designated Anatolia’s southwest and center-south as Italian and French influence zones, foresaw a Franco-British-influenced Kurdish state and an Armenian state in present-day eastern Turkey, and gave Thrace and Izmir to Greece, which had invaded western Anatolia in 1919 and was pushing eastwards. But these terms galvanized the Turkish National Movement (TNM), which was begun by Muslim Ottoman officers and notables in post-armistice Anatolia and was galvanized already in 1919 by the Greek invasion. To many Germans’ envy, by September 1922 the TNM was in control of almost all of present-day Turkey, due to its own military and political-diplomatic force, to Greek overreach, and to divergent Allied interests. To replace the Treaty of Sèvres, negotiations ensued from November 1922 with the Allies in the Swiss city of Lausanne. In January 1923, the Turkish and Greek delegations signed the Convention Regarding the Exchange of Greek and Turkish populations (also Lausanne Convention), by which about 1.5 million Greek Orthodox (“Greek”) inhabitants of Anatolia were forcedly exchanged for about 500,000 Muslim (“Turkish”) inhabitants of Greece. And in July 1923, all delegations signed the Treaty of Lausanne. It imposed some conditions on Turkey, including a minority protection regime patterned on earlier League of Nations models for postwar Eastern Europe. But on the whole, it was a great Turkish success. It inter alia internationally recognized the Turkish Republic, returned Istanbul and the Straits to Turkey, abolished the prewar capitulations, and absolved all perpetrators of the anti-Armenian, -Assyrian, and -Orthodox genocide from legal prosecution.

February 15, 1995

Memorandum for Kenneth C. Brill from Andrew D. Sens, 'Memorandum of Conversation of the President's Expanded Meeting with Chancellor Kohl of Germany'

Kohl and Clinton have a wide ranging discussion on NATO expansion, crises in the Balkans, Chechnya and Northern Africa, relations with Europe, and other subjects.

Pagination