The CIA’s memorandum published on 11 October 1989 brings up the German reunification as an international agenda and assesses its implications for the Soviet Union and the United States.

The document discesses the coalition between Austria and newly united Germany. It highlights the similar political views the countries shares and stresses its economic conflicts. The document continues weighing how to best unite Germany economically and its possible effects on the European Union. It ends with a commitment to ensuring Germany enters the European Union as an equal member.

The document discusses the Soviet position on German unification in six separate parts. The first deals with confusion over Gorbachev's better than expected consent to unification. Second are the potential domestic and foreign policy reasons the USSR consented so readily to unification, followed by the third part which outlines potential Soviet benefits from the process. The fourth section discusses the autonomy of the new German government, which is backed up with the fifth section discussing public sentiment. The final portion discusses the fine line for both the Soviet Union and the West between being overbearing on Germany's new independence and not helping enough.

The report assesses German unity in three parts. The first regards internal factors of integration such as integrating monetary systems and elections. The next portion regards external factors, focusing mainly on the USSR's parameters for reunification regarding NATO and Poland's western border. Finally, the report assesses German reunification and predicts the process will be complete by the end of the year (1990). In addition, it discusses the positive prospects for European Unity and emphasizes Austria's role in binding a newly united Germany to Western Europe.

The document contains a conversation between Chancellor Franz Vranitzky and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher begins with the state of internal affairs in Great Britain then relates its position to the European Union and role in German Unification. The conversation then turns to the role of Austria and its effort to join the European Commission. In the wake of problems in Eastern Europe, Thatcher stresses her preference for Western Europe to avoid involving itself in the counter movements.

The document is a summary of a meeting between French President Francois Mitterrand and Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky, and Vranitzky's ensuing presentation on democracy in Eastern Europe. This included Austria's duties and obligations to this process. Both ministers proceeded to reflect on their country's relationship with Germany both past and future.

The document entails interviews with several Austrian and German officials and recounts their views on various issues surrounding German reunification. The first is an interview with State Minister Adam-Schwater where the primary focus is monetary unification and budgetary restrictions for integration. The second interview is with State Secretary Sudhoff revolves around European issues such as the CSCE, security, border issues, and the time frame for reunification. The notes from State Secretary Lautenschlager reiterate the need for monetary integration in addition to expressing Austria's desire for a European Coalition. The fourth section are notes from both Chancellor Kohl and Ministerial Director Teltschik. In it they reiterate East Germany's desire for reintegration and outline four pressing needs - decisions from the 2+4 agreements, a new security structure, disarmament, and economic development. Finally there are notes from the CSCE Summit, where Austria is asked to evaluate other Eastern European countries (specifically Yugoslavia) and evaluate neutrality in a changing European order.

The document is an updated assessment of German reunification from the Austrian foreign ministry. The assessment begins with addressing three areas which include integrating economic and monetary systems, unifying under current legal framework, and the drop in GDR emigration after the 1990 elections. The next portion focuses on external relations including the new Four Power responsibilities, European political-military affairs, Poland's Western Border, the eradication of the Berlin agreement, and Western European countries influence specifically on intelligence activities. The final part solely concerns Western Germany's projected timeline for total reunification.

The assessment by the Austrian Foreign Ministry of German Unity is broken into five subject areas. The first part concerns the responsibility of the Four Powers to a new unified Germany. Next, West Germany's commitment to German unity dating as far back as 1970. The third portion outlines the border and security concerns of East and West Germany, as well as the Soviet Union, United States, Great Britain, and France. The next part is focused on economic recovery, specifically the lack of certain goods in East Germany (ie cars and houses). Finally, the report addresses the future developments of a unified Germany with an emphasis on the security of nearby states.

The document relays a conversation between East German and Austrian officials about Austria's commitment to potential reunification. The document addresses the possibility in two parts. The first half focuses on leniency with travel and economic reforms including visa-less travel and potential car taxes. The second part focuses on the greater European Cold War balance and addresses topics such as disarmament and inter-bloc cooperation.