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December 24, 1962

Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS, for Discussion with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 26 December [1962]: 'Planning Requirements Resulting from the Nassau Pact and the JUPITER Decision'

JCS Chairman Maxwell Taylor was aware of Kennedy’s Jupiter decision, but it is not clear when the other Chiefs learned of the “closely held decisions.” This paper, approved by General Paul S. Emrick, director of Plans and Policy for the Joint Staff, gave an overall look at the “planning requirements” necessitated by the Jupiter decision and the recent Nassau conference between President Kennedy and UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. Among the issues presented by the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles were retargeting requirements, Sergeant missiles for Italy, the number of Polaris submarines patrolling the Mediterranean and their basing, and the speeding up of F-104G deliveries to Turkey.

March 8, 1969

Memorandum for the President from Henry A. Kissinger, 'Next Steps on the Middle East'

Kissinger details a plan to hold separate talks with the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain with the aim of bringing them closer to the US position and press them to share responsibility for success.

December 10, 1964

Memorandum of Conversation between President Johnson and Prime Minister Harold Wilson

During this conversation Wilson, McNamara, Rusk, and Ball continued the discussion of the British proposal for an Atlantic Nuclear Force, including possible command arrangements. Other topics included the impact of the Chinese nuclear test and a nonproliferation agreement.

December 7, 1964

Untitled Read-Out for State Department of Johnson-Wilson Conversation

Account of the first day of the Johnson-Wilson discussions prepared by State Department Executive Secretary Benjamin Read probably on the basis of an account by Secretary of State Rusk.

December 7, 1964

Memorandum of Conversation between President Johnson and Prime Minister Harold Wilson

In this conversation, President Johnson and Prime Minister Wilson discuss the MLF and the proposed ANF--the "Atlantic Nuclear Force," a British proposal as an alternative to the MLF. The two leaders weighed the pros and cons of both proposals, with President Johnson ultimately deciding to give a positive response to the ANF, leaving it up to the British to see if Bonn could be enlisted.

May 12, 1964

Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Dean Rusk, UK Foreign Secretary Butler, and French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, 'Tripartite Discussion of Non-Dissemination'

In this discussion between Rusk and the British and French Foreign Ministers, the three discuss a proposed British nonproliferation declaration. Rusk had no objection but Couve de Murville found the declaration “patronizing” because it said “in effect that we [nuclear weapons states] are sinners and don’t want others to join us in sin.”

May 29, 1963

State Department Telegram 6389 to US Embassy United Kingdom

In this telegram, President Kennedy encourages Prime Minister Macmillan to take a positive interest in the MLF project, in which the British had little interest because of financial reasons and their doubts about the German role. Kennedy also expressed concern about the future of German nuclear efforts.

September 10, 1954

The Second Secretary at London (Zimmerman) to the Department of State, 'Transmittal of Indian Summary of Tibetan Reports Covering Period January to April 1954'

A summary of the report of the Indian Mission to Lhasa covering January-April 1954.

June 21, 1954

The Second Secretary at London (Zimmerman) to the Department of State, 'Availability of Reports on Tibet from the Indian Consul General at Lhasa'

Robert Zimmerman explains why UK authorities have stopped receiving copies of the reports from the Indian Mission in Lhasa from the Government of India.

April 8, 1954

The Second Secretary at London (Zimmerman) to the Department of State, 'Availability of Reports on Tibet from the Indian Consul General at Lhasa'

Robert Zimmerman explains why the US Embassy has stopped receiving copies of the reports from the Indian Mission in Lhasa.

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