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November 2, 1992

Letter, Pak Dong Tchoun, the DPRK Representative in Paris, to Davies, Head of East Asia in FCO in London

A letter, in French, from Pak Dong Tehoun, the DPRK representative in Paris, to H. Davies, the head of the Far Eastern section of the FCO.

May 6, 1992

David Wright (UK Ambassador in Seoul) to FCO, 'Los Angeles Riots: Korean Reaction'

While geopolitical reconfigurations in the region and issues like arms control and defense posture were of key concern to British observers, American domestic events also fed into British analysis. This report describes South Korean responses to the attacks on Korean-Americans during the riots in Los Angeles in the summer of 1992

September 21, 1967

Memorandum from George Brown to Harold Wilson

When the USSR and the USA submitted a draft non-proliferation treaty in the early autumn of 1967, British representatives were enthusiastically arguing that as a prospective member of EURATOM, any British position must axiomatically take account of European interests.  As the negotiations moved forward, though, Wilson's government found itself caught in a three-sided trap of its own devising: fearful of being labelled “bad Europeans,” anxious about being seen by Washington as “unreliable allies,” and concerned about Moscow viewing them as part of the “treacherous West.”  Balancing out these competing concerns was becoming foremost in the minds of senior ministers.

March 1, 1967

Note for the Record [about a Meeting between the Prime Minister, Sir Burke Trend, and Sir Solly Zuckerman at 10:30a.m. on 1 March 1967]

Two "Notes for the Record" from March 1, 1967, describe the vigorous discussions between senior UK government figures, including Harold Wilson, Foreign Secretary George Brown, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Lord Chalfont, and chief scientific adviser to the government Solly Zuckerman. Brown argued that "our posture on the matter should be distinctively European rather than one of supporting the United States against other European countries." Wilson was even more explicit, stating that "our approach should be that of a European power discussing the matter with European partners and not seeking to fight American battles." Wilson was keen to let Washington take the lead so that his government might avoid upsetting the French, as had happened with the debates over De Gaulle's 1966 withdrawal from the NATO command structure.

March 1, 1967

Note for the Record [about a Meeting between the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, and Lord Chalfont at 6:50p.m. on 1 March 1967]

Two "Notes for the Record" from March 1, 1967, describe the vigorous discussions between senior UK government figures, including Harold Wilson, Foreign Secretary George Brown, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Lord Chalfont, and chief scientific adviser to the government Solly Zuckerman. Brown argued that "our posture on the matter should be distinctively European rather than one of supporting the United States against other European countries." Wilson was even more explicit, stating that "our approach should be that of a European power discussing the matter with European partners and not seeking to fight American battles." Wilson was keen to let Washington take the lead so that his government might avoid upsetting the French, as had happened with the debates over De Gaulle's 1966 withdrawal from the NATO command structure.

February 22, 1967

Non-Proliferation and Our Entry into E.E.C.

The Harold Wilson government was continually focused on the issue of demonstrating that Britain should be seen as a “European” power with interests compatible with the existing EEC membership. This high-level Foreign Office note queried what the UK could do when pulled in different directions by the need to finalize a non-proliferation treaty while avoiding unnecessary damage to its European interests. This memorandum was drafted against a background of rumblings from EEC capitals that by tacitly supporting NPT proposals put forward by U.S. officials the Wilson government was being anti-European.

April 23, 1979

Letter from C.L.G. Mallaby (Arms Control and Disarmament Department) to R.J. Alston (Joint Nuclear Unit), 'South Asia: Nuclear Issues'

This document is a memo from Christopher Mallaby at the FCO's Arms Control and Disarmament Department, to Robert Alston at the Joint Nuclear Unit. In it, Mallaby discusses a prior memo from Alston, as well as a meeting they both had with an official from the US State Department, Thomas Pickering, three days prior.

April 1979

Cable from Cyrus Vance, 'Pakistan's Nuclear Problem'

A telegram from U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance concerning the Pakistani nuclear program that was shared with British officials.

April 19, 1979

Letter from R.J. Alston (Joint Nuclear Unit) to W.K.K. White (South Asia Dept.) and C.L.G. Mallaby (ACDD), 'South Asia - Nuclear Issues'

This document, a letter from Robert Alston of the FCO's Joint Nuclear Unit, to a Mr. W. K. K. White and Mr. Christopher Mallaby, discusses Pakistan's burgeoning nuclear program in the context of the broader South Asian political situation.

April 20, 1979

Letter from R.J Alston (Joint Nuclear Unit) to P.R. Fearn (British Embassy, Islamabad), 'Pakistan Nuclear Programme'

This document is a letter from Robert Alston of the FCO's Joint Nuclear Unit, to Mr. P.R. Fearn at the British Embassy in Islamabad. In the letter, Alston discusses the recent visit of a US State Department official, Thomas Pickering, to the Foreign Office in London.

Pagination