When the USSR and the USA submitted a draft non-proliferation treaty in the early autumn of 1967, British representatives were enthusiastically arguing that as a prospective member of EURATOM, any British position must axiomatically take account of European interests.  As the negotiations moved forward, though, Wilson's government found itself caught in a three-sided trap of its own devising: fearful of being labelled “bad Europeans,” anxious about being seen by Washington as “unreliable allies,” and concerned about Moscow viewing them as part of the “treacherous West.”  Balancing out these competing concerns was becoming foremost in the minds of senior ministers.

Two "Notes for the Record" from March 1, 1967, describe the vigorous discussions between senior UK government figures, including Harold Wilson, Foreign Secretary George Brown, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Lord Chalfont, and chief scientific adviser to the government Solly Zuckerman. Brown argued that "our posture on the matter should be distinctively European rather than one of supporting the United States against other European countries." Wilson was even more explicit, stating that "our approach should be that of a European power discussing the matter with European partners and not seeking to fight American battles." Wilson was keen to let Washington take the lead so that his government might avoid upsetting the French, as had happened with the debates over De Gaulle's 1966 withdrawal from the NATO command structure.

Two "Notes for the Record" from March 1, 1967, describe the vigorous discussions between senior UK government figures, including Harold Wilson, Foreign Secretary George Brown, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Lord Chalfont, and chief scientific adviser to the government Solly Zuckerman. Brown argued that "our posture on the matter should be distinctively European rather than one of supporting the United States against other European countries." Wilson was even more explicit, stating that "our approach should be that of a European power discussing the matter with European partners and not seeking to fight American battles." Wilson was keen to let Washington take the lead so that his government might avoid upsetting the French, as had happened with the debates over De Gaulle's 1966 withdrawal from the NATO command structure.

The Harold Wilson government was continually focused on the issue of demonstrating that Britain should be seen as a “European” power with interests compatible with the existing EEC membership. This high-level Foreign Office note queried what the UK could do when pulled in different directions by the need to finalize a non-proliferation treaty while avoiding unnecessary damage to its European interests. This memorandum was drafted against a background of rumblings from EEC capitals that by tacitly supporting NPT proposals put forward by U.S. officials the Wilson government was being anti-European.

The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs announces its decision to open the NPT for signing in Moscow, Washington, and London beginning on July 1, 1968.

This press release acts as an example for journalists to follow when covering the proceedings of the NPT's signing. Along with basic information about the nations involved in the signing of the NPT, the document lists the names of every notable Soviet official who will be present at the event.

This document is a communication to the Soviet UN delegation in New York, written by Vasily Vasilievich Kuznetsov, the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

This document is a communication to the Soviet UN delegation in New York, written by Vasily Vasilievich Kuznetsov, the First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs describes its contingency plan in case the US and UK refuse to sign the NPT in Geneva. This plan entails opening the treaty for signatures at the same time in Moscow, Washington, and London, using (presumably) the 1966 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies as a precedent for signing an agreement in three places at once.

Analysis by MAE litigation service on the scope and legal relevance of the reaction by depositary states and Australia to the Italian declaration of May 4 1975on the issue of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.