The directive provides details on the decision to build the atomic power station in Hungary, and how payment will be handled.

Statement of the Politburo confirming drafts about helping Hungary build a nuclear power station and receive a credit from the Soviet Union for that purpose.

Directive explaining ways Soviet representatives can help Hungarian experts representing the Hungarian People's Republic construct atomic energy stations.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for Friday, 22 June 1990 describes the latest developments in Poland, EC, USSR, Germany, Hungary, Sri Lanka, Eastern Europe, Japan, US and Liberia.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for Friday, 8 June 1990 describes the latest developments in USSR, West Germany, Peru, Warsaw, Nepal, India, Jordan, Morocco and Bulgaria.

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 20 July 1990 describes the latest developments in South Korea, China, the Soviet Union, Hungary, Haiti and Persian Gulf.

The CIA's National Intelligence Daily for 28 April 1989 describes the latest developments in Lebanon, Iran, China, Vietnam, the Soviet Union, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Hungary, and New Zealand.

An analysis of the complete removal of Soviet troops and its potential effects on Hungarian elections.

President of People’s Republic of Hungary, Rezso Nyers, and General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Karoly Grosz, report on their talks with Gorbachev in Moscow, 24-25 July, 1989. The excerpts contains economic reformer Nyers’ assessment of the political situation in Hungary, and first among the factors that "can defeat the party," he lists "the past, if we let ourselves [be] smeared with it." The memory of the revolution of 1956 and its bloody repression by the Soviets was Banquo’s ghost, destroying the legitimacy of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, just as 1968 in Prague and 1981’s martial law in Poland and all the other Communist "blank spots" of history came back in 1989 to crumble Communist ideology. For their part, the Communist reformers (including Gorbachev) did not quite know how to respond as events accelerated in 1989, except not to repeat 1956.

A CIA/International Operations Division official recommends policies to guide RFE broadcasting to Hungary during the revolution.