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Documents

March 19, 1974

Record of conversation Between T.N. Kaul and Henry Kissinger, 'Indian Ocean'

They discuss creating a "zone of peace" in the Indian Ocean.

May 4, 1958

Note by Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt on Note from the United States

Dutt analyzes a note by the US government on Antarctica passed to India via the UK.

October 24, 1977

Telegram from K. V. Rajan, First Secretary (Pol), 'Agha Shahi’s meeting with [Cyrus] Vance'

Reported comments by Agha Shahi’s on relations with the United States, India, and nuclear weapons.

June 6, 1975

Political Report on the Month of May,1975, Meeting between US President Ford and New Zealand Prime Minister Rowling

The US and New Zealand will maintain amicable relations and cooperate for a Pacific nuclear-free zone

April 3, 1979

Information about the Results of the Official Friendly Visit of A.N. Kosygin in India (March 9-15 of This Year)

This document reports on the visit by the Soviet premier, Alexsei Kosygin, to India in March 1979. The Indian leadership once again confirms its intention to retain close relations with Moscow irrespective of the future relationship with the US and China. During the visit a number of trade and scientific agreements are signed. The USSR expresses its readiness to cooperate in the nuclear field on the basis of peaceful use as laid down in the Indian-Soviet agreement of January 1979. Reacting to the Chinese threat and its perceived objective to gain a hegemonic position in Asia, India wishes to talk about the delivery of more sophisticated military equipment. The Soviet officials interpret Indian foreign policy as moving closer to the Socialist Bloc and joining Vietnam and Cuba in the formation of a ‘leftist wing’ in the Non-Aligned Movement.

December 18, 1986

Regarding the Results of the Visit of Mikhail Gorbachev to India

This document reports on the visit by Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to India in 1986. The report recounts an ever-deepening relationship between India and the Soviet Union. One of the main reasons for the Indian position is the strong support for Pakistan by the US, the delivery of modern weaponry to this country together with concerns that Pakistan will soon develop nuclear weapons. Gandhi also accuses Pakistan of training Sikh terrorists on its territory. The Soviet side intends to further intensify its relations with India and to upgrade them by treating India as a full-fledged world power. The aim is to establish a long-term special relationship with India based on common principles in the foreign arena and close collaboration in all other fields.

August 2, 1973

Rajya Sabha Report on Nuclear Conference in Ann Arbor, Michigan

Transcript of questions and answers between members of the Rajya Sabha on the nuclear energy conference in the United States specifically research, educational reactors, technology, social impacts of nuclear power, and others.

June 5, 1951

Secret Letter from Roger Makins to Michael W. Perrin

Roger Makins of the British Foreign Office informs Michael Perrin, Deputy Controller for Atomic Energy, about negotiations between India and the United States and India and France for nuclear cooperation.

November 19, 1966

India Department of Atomic Energy, 'Cooperation with USA in the Development of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes'

Packet of material prepared by the Department of Atomic Energy regarding research cooperation with the United States. Includes a letter from Glenn Seaborg, Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, a letter from Myron B. Kratzer, of the Division of International Affairs, and a draft of the research agreement.

August 12, 1996

US Embassy in New Delhi Telegram 9250 to State Department, 'Ambassador’s Meeting with Opposition Leader'

Report on US Ambassador to India Frank Wisner's meeting with Indian Opposition Leader Atal Bihari Vajpayee about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and halting any nuclear test. The Ambassador found the meeting unproductive. The CTBT was central to the discussion but it was evident that Vajpayee was not interested and his “body language” indicated that he was inclined to favor a nuclear test. During one point in the discussion, Vajpayee asked, “What if we start underground tests?” According to the embassy’s message, “we interpret his question about testing as indicating that [he] and the BJP would favor a test” and would not be persuaded by U.S. arguments—“reason”—to forego one.

Pagination