Skip to content

Results:

1 - 10 of 14

Documents

July 22, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee, Regarding the final plenary session of the conference (excerpt)

In this telegram Zhou Enlai writes to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee, regarding the final plenary session of the conference. "The Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia" was signed on July 21 and Zhou met with the participating delegations, and celebrated with the delegations from Soviet Union, Vietnam, and China.

July 18, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee, Regarding meeting with Tep Phan

In this telegram Zhou Enlai writes to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee, regarding his meeting with Cambodian Foreign Minister Tep Phan. They discussed the issues of foreign military bases in Cambodia and the incorporation of the resistance force of Cambodia into the forces of the kingdom.

July 15, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee, Regarding meeting with Tep Phan (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Head of the Cambodian delegation)

In this telegram Zhou Enlai informs Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee, about his meeting with the Cambodian Foreign Minister Tep Phan.

July 14, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee (excerpt)

In this telegram Zhou Enlai informs Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee that Mendès-France hopes to reach an agreement by July 20 and insists that concessions be made in regards to the demarcation line.

July 11, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and convey to Ho Chi Minh (excerpt)

In this telegram Zhou Enlai first recounts his meeting with leaders of the Soviet Party and their discussion on the topic of the Geneva Conference. In the second part he says that the communist side has not proposed concession on the question of dividing zones, and lastly Zhou says that he will be leaving soon for Geneva to meet with Molotov and Eden before the conference resumes.

June 19, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zeong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee

Zhou Enlai informs Mao Zeong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee that the proposal concerning a comprehensive settlement raised by the VWP Central Committee has failed to hit the important points and they are not willing to make concessions on the Laos and Cambodia questions.

June 14, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and the CCP Central Committee (excerpt)

Zhou Enlai writes that the French concern for their troops has made them more willing to negotiate. Additionally Zhou assures Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi and the CCP Central Committee that their side has maintained a positive attitude and the world will be left with the impression that their side has consistently pursued negotiations for reaching an agreement, whereas the US is merely attempting to sabotage the conference.

June 8, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee (excerpt)

Zhou Enlai writes to to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee to inform them that the "big adjustment" plan of dividing Vietnam and drawing borders is most favorable to them. He cautions that the other plans are not favorable and that some small concessions might have to be made in order to avoid other less favorable plans.

May 30, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee, (excerpt)

Zhou Enlai highlights the main problems with the Communist negotiation strategy, which lies in lack of proper understanding of the complexity of the Indochina question. He also stresses that both sides need to discuss "three key issues, namely, dividing zones, ceasefire supervision and international guarantee."

May 17, 1954

Telegram, Zhou Enlai to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee (excerpt)

Zhou Enlai informs Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, and the CCP Central Committee that despite an increased possibility for ceasefire, there are plots for sabotaging the ceasefire in Indochina by the US and factions for war in France.

Pagination