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October 10, 1963

John McCone (Director of Central Intelligence Agency) to Mexico City, 'Chinese in Mexico of Operational Interest'

The CIA director reports that the Agency is in control of Liang Sicheng’s brother in the US and is using him to arrange a meeting between the two men in Mexico City, in which Liang Sicheng's defection would be raised as a real possibility.

June 19, 1950

Current Capabilities of the Northern Korean Regime

This report assesses the capabilities of North Korea in reference to; the Soviet position, the current political, economic, and military situations, and the current operations against South Korea.

May 22, 1964

State Department Executive Secretary Benjamin H. Read to National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, 'NSAM 241 on Report on French Gaseous Diffusion Plant'

Noting that the situation that gave rise to NSAM 41 had improved, Read informed Bundy that intelligence reporting would continue but he wanted permission to stop work responsive to the NSAM. There had been “no indication of any attempts by the French to enlist German or Italian cooperation in the Pierrrelatte project.”

October 30, 1976

The President's Daily Brief, October 30, 1976

A summary of the North Korean smuggling scandal in Scandinavia produced by the US intelligence community.

November 2, 1976

National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, November 2, 1976

A summary of the North Korean smuggling scandal in Scandinavia produced by the US intelligence community.

November 5, 1976

Central Intelligence Agency, 'Weekly Summary,' November 5, 1976

A CIA summary of the North Korean smuggling scandal in Scandinavia.

December 23, 1965

Telegram from John F. Root, Office of Northern African Affairs, 'Subject: Bulgarian Fronting For Russian Interests in Ethiopia'

Observations by Israeli and US diplomats of the Soviet Union's attempt at indirect economic penetration of Ethiopia during the mid-1960s. The Ethiopian regime was suspicious of Soviet intervention, thus they had to resort to the help of the East European states, in this case Bulgaria.

August 14, 1967

Intelligence Note 669 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Tests of Soviet Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS)'

Soviet tests of a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) attracted the interest of the US intelligence community because of the unique challenges it posed to defenses. At that point, August 1967, the US had no means to detect a FOBs attack but INR noted that a satellite detection system would be operational during 1970. This was a reference to the secret Defense Support Program (DSP), which would use infrared technology to detect missile launches and reduce any surprise advantage from the FOBs. The Soviets recognized this and later retired their twenty or so ICBMs with FOBs capabilities in 1983.

March 27, 1967

Intelligence Note 242 from George C. Denney, Jr., to the Secretary, 'Peking May Have ICBMs in 1971'

Years before Beijing actually deployed an ICBM in 1981, US intelligence estimated the possibility of the deployment of a “few operable, though probably relatively inefficient missiles” as early as 1971.

May 14, 1964

Research Memorandum INR-16 from Thomas L. Hughes to the Secretary, 'Indian Nuclear Weapons Development'

An intelligence report that the fuel core of the Canadian-Indian Reactor (CIR) at Trombay was being changed every six months raised questions about India’s nuclear objectives: a six-month period was quite short for “normal research reactor operations,” but it was the optimum time for using the CIR’s spent fuel for producing weapons grade plutonium. According to INR, India had taken the “first deliberate decision in the series leading to a nuclear weapon,” which was to have “available, on demand, unsafeguarded weapons-grade plutonium or, at the least, the capacity to produce it.”

Pagination