In response to the increase of anti-Soviet and Romanian nationalist propaganda, the Moldavian KGB decides to form a new organization, Section 3, "to provide a principled basis for the activity concerning the defense of the Soviet constitutional regime." Detailed instructions are given for the new Sections operations and activities.

Report by the Moldavian KGB on the decisions it had implemented of the USSR KGB Collegium from the previous year. Includes work to counter Romanian nationalist propaganda. Romania is referred to by the code name "Objective 24." General-Lieutenant G.M. Volkov, the Chairman of the Moldavian SSR KGB, maintained that an all-out offensive was required, including the use of “persons of trust from among the ranks of people of science, culture and art,” in order to neutralize “the subversive activity of the adversary” by identifying and isolating the “emissaries of the adversary” and imposing “permanent and reliable operational control” over them.

Information from the KGB shared with the Stasi about a high-level review of US policy by the Department of State. Presidential Directive [NS-NSDD] 54 from [September] 1982 made the main US objective to subvert Soviet influence in Eastern Europe.

A report by the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Mircho Spasov, on the Ministerial Meeting in Bucharest of delegations from Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the Soviet Union. The meeting called for focusing on preventing subversive acts of Western intelligence, improving exchange of information, and conducting joint operations.

A report on the visit that had to improve exchange of information between the two intelligence agencies.

This folder consists of a detailed operational plan for cooperation between the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB for the years 1975-1978. Specific objectives include penetrating the military, political, and economic establishments of the United States, Britain, West Germany, France, and NATO, impeding the activities of the Czech Congress of National Development (KNR), collecting information on “Zionist intrigues,” gathering scientific/technical information on Western achievements in the fields of biological, chemical, and thermonuclear weapons, and using active measures to curtail the activities of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in West Germany.

BCP CC Politburo approves the request of the Minister of Internal Affairs, Angel Tzanev, for an increase in the intelligence staff in response to the need for expanding intelligence operations in China, Albania, Romania, Yugoslavia and Vietnam – a move closely coordinated with the KGB.

Annual review presented by V.V. Fedorchuk, chairman of the KGB in the Ukrainian SSR, summarizes the main successes, failures, and future priorities of the KGB in 1971.