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Documents

June 27, 1985

Experimental chemical attack on June 27, 1985

The file contains correspondence from the Iraqi Army Chief of Staff in 1985 about the experimental chemical attack on Iraqi soldiers and the impact on them.

March 1987

1987 Presidential Orders (Saddam Hussein): use of chemicals in the "Balisan Basin"

This file contains 1987 Presidential Orders by Saddam Hussein, IIS (M1 and M5) and the Military to use chemical weapons against Iranian rebels and the Northern region villages who operated in the "Balisan Basin." It is recommended to use 1/3 Mustard supply and 2/3 of Ricin supply (Pages 23 and 25) using mortars, artillery and helicopters. Document contains correspondence within the GMID and the secretary of the president about a strike plan against the pro Iranians and Khomeini Guards near the Iraqi-Turkish-Iranian border in Northern Iraq, using chemical weapons. The study indicates a recommendation by the GMID to the secretary and the Army Staff Presidency to conduct a surprise strike around June 1987 using Sarin, Ricin, and Mustard gas in limited quantity.

May 1, 1991

Saddam Hussein and Military Officials Discussing the Condition of the Iraqi Army and Its Possible Enlargement

This audio file from a meeting dated 1 May 1991 between Saddam Hussein and the General Command of the Army regarding the enlargement of the Army, the political changes which affect the Army and its training. Saddam Hussein admired the forming of the Republican Guards groups, soldeirs who participated in Qadissyah Saddam (Iran-Iraq War). In addition, this file includes a discussion regarding the invasion of Kuwait and the low morale of Iraqi soldiers, the American request to cease-fire because of the Iraqi soldiers' brevity, the gradual erosion of Iraqi morale on the front, and the increase of Divisions' numbers within the Army. Major General Sultan discussed the use of high-technology weapons by the American forces in the First Gulf War.

Date unknown

Saddam Talks About His Army and How the Iraqis Are Strong and United with Their Leader in a Regular Meeting Expressing Personal Philosophy

This 97 minute audio file comes from a meeting between Saddam Hussein and some other Iraqi officials, possibly Ba'ath Party members. During the meeting, Saddam explains to the others his personal philosophies on the difference between the terms "democracy," "freedom," "liberty," and "capitalism."

March 29, 2003

Speech made by Saddam Hussein containing instructions for the Iraqi Army to attack the enemy

Contains correspondence between the Army Staff, Military movements Directorate and leadership of military units regarding a speech by Saddam Hussein.

October 28, 2020

Interview with Donald Sinclair

Donald Sinclair is a former Canadian diplomat. He served as a member of the Canadian delegation to ACRS. 

November 11, 2020

Interview with Sallai Meridor

Sallai Meridor is a former Israeli diplomat. He served as a member of the Israeli delegation to ACRS. 

September 23, 2020

Interview with Daniel Kurtzer

Ambassador Daniel Kurtzer is a former US diplomat. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Near East Bureau at the US Department of State during the ACRS process, the coordinator of the multilateral peace talks following the Madrid peace conference, and the U.S. representative in the multilateral Steering Group .  

September 13, 2020

Interview with Fred Axelgard

Fred Axelgard is a former US diplomat. He served as a member of the US delegation to ACRS.

December 2, 1947

Report on the Activities of the Arab Office, Washington, for the First Six Months Beginning Nov.1.1945 (Excerpts)

In March 1945, the Arab League (AL) was founded in Cairo. It arrived at the tail-end of a gargantuan four-year-long endeavor to economically integrate the entire Middle East and North and northeast Africa in order to make its polities more self-sufficient during the world war, in which shipping with Allied countries was dangerous and when military trumped civilian needs. This endeavor was supported by national authorities, aided by the United States, and directed by officials of the British Empire. Britain was paramount in the region, and by 1943 its armies, with the US military, evicted all German and Italian troops from North Africa.

Towards the end of the war, the British Empire developed a greater interest in allied Arab countries cooperating more closely. Hence, it backed the establishment of the AL. The latter was not at all simply a British project, though. It also reflected a highly particular version of pan-Arab nationalism: rather than promoting territorial or political unification, it allowed key states to assert their voice in the Arab World.

The Arab League had six founding members. These were Saudi Arabia, a British ally, and Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Transjordan, which all were in various ways British-ruled; so was Yemen, which joined in May 1945. Though Palestinians worked with it, Palestine was not an official founding member. Britain was not keen. As Palestine’s Mandate power, it continued to heed Yishuvi interests. Moreover, AL member governments were not truly supportive either. They did, however, take a great interest in the Palestine conflict. In November 1945, the AL re-established the Arab Higher Committee (AHC), which first was founded at the start of the Palestine Revolt, in 1936, but outlawed by Britain in 1937. When the AHC imploded due to intra-Palestinian infighting, the AL in 1946 created the Arab Higher Executive, renamed AHC in 1947. Moreover, the AL in 1945 declared a boycott of all Jewish-owned businesses in Palestine. And in 1945, too, it executed plans going back to 1944 to open abroad public relations “Arab Offices” (AO), whose main writ was to explain why Palestine’s Arabs, not the Zionists, should become the sovereign in Palestine. One AO was in London. Another was in Washington, DC, open until 1948, and a third followed in 1946 in New York, open until 1947; they have been treated in Rory Miller’s “More Sinned against than Sinning?: The Case of the Arab Office, Washington” (2004) and Daniel Rickenbacher’s “The Arab League's Propaganda Campaign in the US Against the Establishment of a Jewish State” (2020). 

Supported by some British officials, the AL opened AOs in the United States because it feared Zionist lobbying and public relations there and because it knew the US government would help shape the postwar Middle East, even if Britain was still the premier power. The man behind the idea of the AOs, Musa Alami (1897-1984), and a majority of AO officials, including Ahmed Shukairy (1908-1980), were Palestinians. There were other Arabs, too. One was the Lebanese Nejla Abu-Izzedin (1908-2008), who had received her PhD from the University of Chicago in 1934; another was the Anglo-Lebanese Cecil Hourani (1917-2020), brother of the famous historian Albert Hourani (1915-1993), who discussed the AO in An Unfinished Journey: Lebanon and Beyond (1984).

The text printed here, excerpts from a report, in English, reflects the work of the Washington AO, its travails, and the AL officials’ views of the US. It is noteworthy that the original of the text forms part of a broader file created by the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, Jerusalem, the para-state government of the Yishuv in British Mandate Palestine. The file is kept at the Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem.

Pagination