The document describes the negotiations between Soviet leaders and Nasser, which mainly focused on the conflict in the Middle East and the possible recognition of the GDR by the United Arab Republic. Nasser emphasized that there would be no direct talks between the UAR and Israel, but that the UAR would be willing to take part in a UN negotiated attempt to solve the conflict, upon the condition that Israel withdraw its troops from the occupied territories. Nasser was reluctant to follow the Soviet demand for a diplomatic recognition of the GDR.

Ulbricht writes to Brezhnev about the delegation to the UAR, led by Mr. Weiss. Ulbricht assesses the political situation in the UAR with respect to Nasser and the weak situation of the Arab Socialist Union. Ulbricht also informs Brezhnev about the situation in the SAR, which seems to be worsening due to a lack of concepts for postwar recovery. Ulbricht suggests sending economic and political experts in order to strengthen the cooperation between the UAR, the SAR and the socialist countries.

Letter from Erich Honecker to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad expressing the GDR's opposition to the Israeli occupation of land acquired during the 1967 Six-Day War, and enumerating the military equipment which had recently been delivered to Syria from the GDR.

Minutes of conversation between Yugoslav Deputy Secretary for Foreign Affairs M. Pavicevic and Israeli Representative in Belgrade A. Dagan in which Pavicevic officially informs Dagan of Yugoslavia's intention to sever diplomatic ties with Israel.

Arif and Boumedienne talked to Brezhnev and Kossygin about the Six-Day War and discussed with them the possibilities for the Arab countries. The first possibility is to negotiate with the US and Israel and the second, to continue fighting, regardless of the cost. The Algerian representatives favored the second option, suggesting that otherwise an overthrow of the progressive Arab governments would be likely. Brezhnev and Kossygin argued, however, that a political solution would be more appropriate and that the main goal at the present time should be to strengthen the armies of Syria, Jordan and the UAR, and to support these countries in every respect.

Polish document describing the speech given by Soviet Leader Leonid Brezhnev to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) on the actions undertaken by the Soviet leadership before and during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Brezhnev tells the CC CPSU plenum that the Arab struggle in the Middle East has both a class struggle and a national liberation dimension. Brezhnev blames Israeli aggression for the start of the war and Arab blunders and low morale for the humiliating defeat of the UAR forces. Given the success of the Israeli Defense Forces, the Soviets were forced to consider diplomatic and political methods for saving the Arab leadership. When Israeli forces did not stop their aggression against Syria, threatening to overrun the Syrian capital of Damascus, Brezhnev claims tells the CC CPSU that Soviet leadership warned the Americans that the Soviet Army would have to intervene and, at the same time, threatened the Israeli that any further actions would result in Soviet involvement in the war. Brezhnev claims that, since the war ended just hours after the Soviets had made their threats, the imperialist powers acquiesced to Soviet demands. This documents is a translation of the version the Soviet leadership sent to the United Polish Workers’ Party for the information of the Polish leadership.

The document summarizes Czechoslovak Politburo Secretary Vladimir Koucki's conversations with UAR President Gamal A. Nasser, Vice President Zakaria Muhi al-Din,and Arab Socialist Union (ASU) Secretary Ali Sabri during his visit to the UAR. The conversations concerned the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 and the UAR's military and economic situation. Koucki draws three conclusions about the UAR's position, mentioning pressure from internal and external reactionary forces and the lagging national economy. The appendix contains a report on military issues raised during a conversation between the commander of the UAR armed forces, General Muhammad Fawzi, and General Miroslav Smoldash of the Czech delegation. Koucki attributes Egypt's defeat in the war to technical and tactical weaknesses of the military leadership. He recommends that Czech cooperation with the UAR include economic support, military training, and delivery of military equipment.

Discussion with the Soviet Foreign Ministry on the direction of India’s foreign policy. Topics covered include Indian opposition to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; India’s position on the escalating tensions between Egypt and Israel; the possible establishment of a new Asian regional economic bloc; and the recent decision by the United States to eliminate military aid to both India and Pakistan. Soviet policy towards India and Pakistan is also discussed, including the possibility of providing military supplies to Pakistan.

Zhivkov presents the BCP position on the Six-Day War.

Brevhnev describes discussions he's had with North Vietnamese leaders, who only want the U.S. bombings to end in order to open negotiations. He also discusses the outcome of the Arab-Israeli war at the UN General Assembly; even though the assembly condemned Israel, the Arabs are shaken by defeat. The only hope for the Arabs is the support of the USSR. He has also warned Fidel Castro not to push things too far.