Skip to content

Results:

1 - 10 of 11

Documents

March 14, 1967

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, No.76.091, TOP SECRET, March 14, 1967

A record of conversation with the head of the External Relations Section of the 'Rodong Sinmun' discussing North Korea's reunification policy.

March 24, 1974

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.127

In the aftermath of the failed inter-Korean dialogues, the North Koreans conclude that they must establish diplomatic relations with the United States. The telegram describes the rationale behind the move and the goal of limiting the interference of the United States on the Korean Peninsula. According to the author, North Korea believes that the rejection of the US to establish relations with the DPRK will expose Washington's opposition to the unification of Korea.

December 6, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 61.537

The document describes how the North Koreans enthusiastically celebrated the consensus of Committee No. 1 over the Korean issue in the UN; however, Lazar believes that the Korean leadership has not actually grasped the full implications of the decision. In addition, the telegram describes how Pyongyang's attempt to reassert control over South Korean islands close to the North Korean shores in the Yellow Sea has created friction between the two countries. The author also mentions that North Korean support for the student movements in South Korea legitimized Seoul's harsher crackdown on the dissident movements.

November 26, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 61.530

The telegram highlights the new South Korean effort to normalize relations with China and the USSR. Both Soviet and Chinese officials reject the overture from South Korea.

November 15, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 061.465, Urgent

The document describes several gatherings of Korean People's Army corps in Pyongyang where military leaders presented a report underlying the necessity of increasing the level of technical and combat preparedness of the army. The author observes how the rhetoric of driving out "American imperialists" and unifying the peninsula had reappeared in North Korea.

February 25, 1974

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, Urgent, No. 060.079

The Embassy of Romania of Pyongyang assesses the February 15 naval clash between North and South Korea based on the comments of B.K. Pimenov, Minister-Counselor within the USSR Embassy in Pyongyang.

January 6, 1973

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, SECRET, No. 061.005, Urgent

The telegram comments on several changes and challenges to North Korea's 6 year plan (1971-76). Romanian sources report that Pyongyang set unrealistic goals and production quotas on North Korea's heavy industry that is burdened by the deficit of raw materials. The telegram also points out North Korea's growing foreign trade with capitalist nations, while export quotas to socialist countries have only been partially fulfilled. The author points to lagging in many of North Korea's industrial sectors and comments that Pyongyang's economic goals will require massive financial efforts over the short-term.

March 17, 1968

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, TOP SECRET, No. 76.068, Urgent

The Embassy of Romania in the DPRK reports on discussions held between DPRK Minister of National Defense, Kim Changbong, and Leonid Brezhnev on Soviet intervention in the event that an armed conflict were to break out in Korea.

January 29, 1968

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, TOP SECRET, No. 76.026, Flash

The Embassy of Romania in the DPRK summarizes a meeting held with D. Tsvetkov, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang. Tsvetkov discussed Soviet mediation efforts between the United States and North Korea, as well as the Soviet Union's overall response to the USS Pueblo crisis.

January 26, 1968

Telegram from Pyongyang to Bucharest, TOP SECRET, No. 76.020, Flash

Following a meeting with staff from the East German Embassy, the Embassy of Romania in the DPRK summarizes the views of Pak Seong-cheol, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party and Vice President of the Cabinet and Foreign Minister of the DPRK, on the seizure of the USS Pueblo.

Pagination