A description of the political and economic situation in South and North Korea, and on the presence of the struggling democratic and reactionary forces and their influence among the people. Attached are three appendices on the combat and strength of the South Korean and the People's Army of North Korea, the amount of weapons in the People's Army, and the amount of ammunition in the People's Army as of August 1, 1949.

A telegram informing Stalin that there has been about 37 violations from the South Koreans over the 38 parallel, and that the Soviet government should advise the North Koreans to take appropriate measures to be ready to respond to more provocative actions from the North Koreans.

Agreement between the government of the Soviet Union and the government of the DPRK to grant the Republic of Korea a loan to pay for the supplied equipment and materials, as well as military equipment.

List of agreements between the two governments that state that the USSR will leave some of their navy forces in the port of Chongjin, and that the DPRK will provide the necessary housing and facilities for the troops. Troops will be excused from customs and those working for the troops can move across borders with documents decided by both the USSR and DPRK.

Soviet, Chinese, and North Korean officials discuss the military situation in Korea and the status of armistice talks.

Terenti Shtykov reports on Kim Il Sung's military planning for an invasion of South Korea and signals Soviet approval for the invasion.

Stalin agrees with Mao Zedong that North Korea is not yet ready to launch an assault, and reports that the Soviet Union has told North Korea to concentrate on developing liberated areas and guerrillas in South Korea.

Telegram instructing Ambassador Razuvaev to discuss with Kim Il Sung details for reorganizing the KPA administrative and command structure.

Telegram from Amb. Rauvaev to Stalin reporting on the changes planned in the structure of the KPA, per Stalin's telegram of 30 January

Telegram from Shtykov to Stalin (copied to the Soviet leadership) describing the successes of KPA forces in the South. He also relays the concern of some of the DPRK cadre regarding American intervention.