To the question of whether to send back the ethnic Korean officers back to Korea, the Central Military Commission answers in the affirmative and writes that CMC has already asked for Korean officers to come to China to reorganize the troops and bring them back home.

Zhou Enlai advises the Chinese UN representatives on how to explain and respond to representatives from other countries regarding the Korea issue and the proposed armistice.

Zhou Enlai expresses that China is the most interested in the opinion of the U.S. and the UN regarding the conditions for an armistice on the Korean peninsula, and makes clear that the 38th parallel is no longer in existence.

Zhou Enlai sends detailed reports to Mao Zedong on new recruits from the Northeast; the replenishment of military supplies; the distribution of Soviet infantry weapons; the repair of railways and transportation; the condition of airports in North Korea; the use of artillery and tank units; and the stationing of command posts.

Zhou Enlai asks for Mao Zedong's instructions on whether to attack Seoul in January or postpone the attack until March, and gives details on the benefits of postponing the attack.

Zhou Enlai reports to Mao Zedong on his talk with Zakharov about their strategic intentions and plans to cross the 38th parallel. Zakharov insists that one army should be moved to the Wonsan area to cover the southward-advancing flank, despite Zhou's disagreement with this move.

The CCP Central Committee gives instructions to the Chinese representatives to the UN on how to reply to confrontation over the Korean issue. The Chinese representatives are to express willingness to end military action as well as desire to know the UN and the U.S.'s positions on the conditions for an armistice.

Zhou Enlai reports on Soviet replies to telegrams from the Chinese side.

The agreement establishes a Joint Headquarters between the Chinese and North Korean sides that will command the North Korean People's Army, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, and all guerrilla forces, and details the leadership and specific powers and operations of the Joint Headquarters.

Zhou Enlai gives instructions on how the Chinese side should respond when confronted with questions of whether China should back down in regards to the North Korean issue and the Taiwan issue. In particular, he emphasizes that the Chinese side should focus on blaming American imperialism for the invasions of North Korea and Taiwan and maintaining that China's involvement in these issues is essential.