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July 27, 1953

President Eisenhower to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee)

Eisenhower informs Rhee that US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles will be visiting Korea shortly.

October 12, 1973

Verbatim Transcript of the Third Meeting between Prime Minister Trudeau and Premier Zhou Enlai

Zhou Enlai and Trudeau have a wideranging conversation on international politics, covering the Vietnam War, Sino-Japanese relations, Nixon's visit to China, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Arctic circle, and nuclear energy safeguards, among other topics.

August 7, 1953

Summary Record of the Conference held between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles (Third Session)

President Rhee and Secretary Dulles have concluded the final negotiations for the US-ROK defense pact and now both believe it is time to inform the American and Korean public. Rhee emphasizes that he will not accept Korean neutralization and it is imperative to remove the Chinese from the north. Dulles states that the US will do its best to unify Korea under one peaceful government and will try to remove the Chinese aggressors in the north.

August 6, 1953

Proposed Joint Statement by President Rhee and Secretary Dulles

In this proposed joint statement, President Rhee and Secretary Dulles discuss the terms for the joint security pact between the ROK and the US.

August 3, 1953

Confidential Memorandum, Before Agreeing to the Armistice Agreement

When the United States agreed to a truce talk to end the Korea War, President Syngman Rhee disapproved. He opposed the truce and tried to attack these peace proceedings through a serious of events- such as releasing thousands of prisoners of war and creating turmoil for the US government. In order to persuade Rhee to accept the armistice defense, the US dispatches Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson to meet with the South Korean president in a series of bargaining discussions. Eventually, under certain conditions and a mutual defense pact with the US, Rhee agrees to the armistice.

August 6, 1953

Summary Memorandum, US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty (August 6)

In 1953, Secretary Dulles met President Rhee to discuss the US-ROK mutual defense treaty. This summary memorandum notes twelve of Rhee’s requests and/or points he will like this treaty to incorporate. These include the number of ROKA divisions, which economic model the US should use to help Korea’s economy, and the request for moral and material support for the ROK to resume war with the north. This summary also notes whether the US granted, wanted to further discuss, or rejected each point.

August 5, 1953

Summary Record of the Conference held between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles (First Session)

In early August of 1950, delegates from the United States and the Republic of Korea met to discuss the logistics for the forthcoming conferences centered on the creation of a strong US-ROK mutual defense treaty. The delegates also propose who can and should be present. While both sides agree that North Korea and China should be included, President Rhee advocates that due to India’s Prime Minister’s “pro-communist views,” India should not be invited.

July 27, 1953

The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to President Eisenhower

Rhee thanks Eisenhower for US appropriations for South Korea and congratulates him on the Korean War armistice.

April 15, 1954

The Question of a Conference of the Five Great Powers with the Participation of the PRC

At a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, US, Britain and France, the USSR proposes a conference including the PRC, but the others oppose China's participation.

June 19, 1953

Minutes of Discussion at the 150th Meeting of the National Security Council, 18 June 1953

The US National Security Council discusses recent release of prisoners of war in South Korea. The riots and disturbances in East Germany and Czechoslovakia are discussed in the context of the general “softening” of Soviet policy. The Council also discusses the possibility of a four-power meeting, and other alternative courses of action.