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Documents

November 26, 1953

Letter, Syngman Rhee to John W. Staggers

Syngman Rhee response to "Jack" of Phillips Associates regarding an offer of seed corn to distribute in Korea. He mentions issues with the Indian Custodial Force who were guarding prisoners of war following the armistice agreement.

July 27, 1953

President Eisenhower to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee)

Eisenhower informs Rhee that US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles will be visiting Korea shortly.

July 4, 1953

CPSU Central Committee Decision

About the draft response to Clark's letter from the 29th of June.The decision instructs Malenkov and Molotov to answer the Chinese comrades, and inform them of the Soviet Union's agreement their assessment and the measures proposed on the issue of peace talks in Korea, in connection with the Clark's letter.

June 3, 1953

Record of Molotov's Conversation with US Ambassador Bohlen

A follow-up conversation after the one on the 28th of May. The two discuss the talks that were taking place in Panmunjom, and Bohlen mentions the American men with Soviet wives currently residing in the Soviet Union. Molotov is unaware of this situation.

November 3, 1952

CPSU Politburo Decision with an Approved Message from Pushkin to Stalin

Decision to approve the draft TASS publication denying the reported talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on the Korean issue.

August 7, 1953

Summary Record of the Conference held between President Rhee and Secretary Dulles (Third Session)

President Rhee and Secretary Dulles have concluded the final negotiations for the US-ROK defense pact and now both believe it is time to inform the American and Korean public. Rhee emphasizes that he will not accept Korean neutralization and it is imperative to remove the Chinese from the north. Dulles states that the US will do its best to unify Korea under one peaceful government and will try to remove the Chinese aggressors in the north.

August 3, 1953

Confidential Memorandum, Before Agreeing to the Armistice Agreement

When the United States agreed to a truce talk to end the Korea War, President Syngman Rhee disapproved. He opposed the truce and tried to attack these peace proceedings through a serious of events- such as releasing thousands of prisoners of war and creating turmoil for the US government. In order to persuade Rhee to accept the armistice defense, the US dispatches Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson to meet with the South Korean president in a series of bargaining discussions. Eventually, under certain conditions and a mutual defense pact with the US, Rhee agrees to the armistice.

September 28, 1950

Outgoing Cable No. 18249, Gromyko to Vyshinsky

Gromyko asks Vyshinsky to get Tsarapkin to inform American intermediary Lancaster that Malik has agreed to the meeting. Malik must hear out the Americans and if it seems that they're willing to work towards a peaceful resolution, tell Lancaster that any questions that the Americans had during this discussion will be answered in the next meeting.

August 14, 1953

Memorandum, President Syngman Rhee to All Diplomatic Officials

Following the ratification of the Armistice Agreement and the Mutual Defense Treaty, President Rhee conveys that he expects the Armistice to fail because the communists will “undoubtedly” violate it and undermine Korean independence. Rhee wants to renew war to secure victory but most importantly to strengthen the ROK-U.S alliance. Following the memorandum he makes twelve points ranging from topic like Korean rehabilitation to prisoners of war from the Korean War.

May 4, 1953

Letter, General Duk Shin Choi to General William K. Harrison, Jr. on Civilian Internees

From April 20 to May 3 1953, Operation Little Switch allowed the exchange of the sick and wounded prisoners of wars between the United Nations, North Korea, and China. In this letter, Major General Choi informs General Harrison that the communist have failed to return hundreds of U.N. POWs because of their broad interpretation of the agreement. General Choi provides a series of steps to improve this agreement but most importantly he urges that the terms “civilian internees” and “displaced person” should be clarified in the Draft Armistice Agreement.

Pagination