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Documents

November 9, 1962

Memorandum from William R. Tyler to the Secretary [Dean Rusk] through U. Alexis Johnson, 'Turkish and Italian IRBM's'

Seymour Weiss would push back against any efforts to remove the Jupiters, but he and others realized that President Kennedy had a “keen interest” in the matter and that Secretary of Defense McNamara had ordered that action be taken (assigning his General Counsel John McNaughton to take the lead). Nevertheless Weiss and Assistant Secretary of State William Tyler presented Secretary of State Rusk with a memorandum making the case against action on the Jupiters or at least postponing their removal until a “later time.” Paralleling arguments made during the crisis by Ambassadors Hare and Reinhardt, Tyler pointed to the “symbolic and psychological importance” of the Jupiter deployments. While Tyler noted parenthetically that the Italians had “given indications of a disposition to work toward the eventual removal of the Jupiters,” the U.S. could not phase them out “without general Alliance agreement,” including Italy and Turkey’s consent, “unless we are prepared to lay ourselves open to the charge of abrogation of specific or implied agreements.” Rusk was in the know on the secret deal, but his reference to a “later time” was consistent with it and signing the memo would have placated Tyler and Weiss.

March 27, 1990

National Intelligence Daily for Tuesday, 27 March 1990

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 27 March 1990 describes the latest developments in the Soviet Union, Colombia, Kuwait, OPEC, Afghanistan, Cuba, Guatemala and El Salvador.

July 3, 1991

National Intelligence Daily for Wednesday, 3 July 1991

The CIA’s National Intelligence Daily for 3 July 1991 describes the latest developments in Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, Iraq, Israel, Peru, China, and Cuba.

April 28, 1989

Joint Press Statement on Namibia

Press release describing a tripartite meeting between delegations from Angola, South Africa, and Cuba about troop withdrawal from Namibia. South African and SWAPO forces are restricted to their respective bases.

1989

Defense Intelligence Agency Briefing, 'The 1987-88 Combat in Southern Angola: Lessons Learned'

Analysis of the military campaign waged in Southern Angola in 1987-88 as well as the lessons learned from this exchange. Document indicates that FAPLA failed to learn from its mistakes, while UNITA adapted much more effectively to the combat environment it faced in Angola. Although FAPLA managed to hold on to Cuito Cuanavale, its large losses led to a Cuban build-up in Southern Angola, which challenged the existing military balance in the region. This provided new impetus to peace negotiations and resulted in the December 1988 Accords among South Africa, Angola and Cuba.

February 8, 1984

Memorandum of Conversation between Abelardo Colomé, Ulises Rosales and Konstantin Kurochkin

Cuban general Abelardo Colomé followed Angolan affairs closely; General Ulises Rosales was Cuba’s first deputy defense minister; General Konstantin Kurochkin was the head of the Soviet Military Mission in Angola.

October 18, 1962

Telegram from Polish Embassy in Washington (Drozniak), 18 October 1962

Drozniak forwards a report from US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs [Edwin M.] Martin. Martin says that the Americans are well-informed of the military situation in Cuba, that Cuba does not possess nuclear weapons (nor will they be likely to because the USSR did not give such weapons to China, so why would they give them to Cuba?), that the level of the Cuban economy is twenty-five percent lower than the period before Fidel Castro came to power and Cuba is much more economically dependent on the USSR, and finally that any military invasion or complete blockade of Cuba would be considered an act of war by the USSR.

October 27, 1962

Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Presidium Protocol 62

Protocol 62 illustrates how it was Khrushchev who raised the stakes during the missile crisis and dictated a new letter to Kennedy indicating he would only remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange of the United States withdrawing its military bases from Turkey and Pakistan. The Pakistan demand would later be dropped, however and the US would only agree to remove its IRBMs from Turkey.

October 31, 1962

Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to USSR Ambassador to Cuba A. I. Alekseev

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko cables the Soviet Embassy in Havana that the Soviet leadership had decided to allow UNSG U Thant and his representatives to visit Soviet launchers sites in Cuba and verify that the launchers are being dismantled.

November 1, 1962

Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to North Korea Vasily Moskovsky and Kim Il Sung

The Soviet Ambassador Vasily Moskovsky and Kim Il Sung discuss DPRK’s border security in the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis. By pointing out North Korea’s poor air defense and coast guard capabilities, Kim Il Sung requests an increase in the Soviet military assistance. He clearly states that DPRK is in favor of a peaceful resolution of the Cuban Crisis, because according to him, the socialist camp does not need a military conflict at that time. The two also discuss the economic development of the country.

Pagination