The Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party authorizes the creation of a Bulgarian delegation to negotiate a protocol on delivering “special equipment” (military arms/weapons) to Cuba in 1964. The Central Committee’s resolution includes a suggested amount of aid.

The Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian Navy issued an order to prepare the Navy for mobilization, citing a Bulgarian government declaration about the Cuban missile crisis. The Chief of Staff's secret order includes 19 specific commands for preparation. Commands include orders regarding necessary supplies for combat readiness, repair schedules, deployment, arming vessels, radio communication, and increased surveillance, among others. The Chief of Staff order includes reporting requirements and specific dates for execution.

12 million BGN, five-year plan for arms delivery to People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), Lao People's Revolutionary Party, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and the Lebanese Communist Party.

This document includes a memorandum from the Chairman of the State Planning Commission who recommends exporting excess military production to countries in Africa and Asia. In an attached table the production capacities of the Bulgarian military-industrial complex are shown.

A Defense Ministry report on The 1973 War. The report discusses the weaknesses in the Arab military strategy – lack of coordination, lack of serious commitment, insufficient mobilization of available resources, etc.

A description of measures taken by the military leadership of FMNL to improve the organized struggle in Central America, in terms of creating opportunities for large-scale operations intended to lead to the ultimate defeat of the enemy – the government-supported army of El Salvador. The information was compiled based on sources of the Vietnamese Embassy in Havana, and with the cooperation of the Cuban comrades. According to the document, a decision was made to regroup military units from small squads to battalions and brigades. Following this course, the partisan movements earned considerable success in 1984, but their actions easy to trace due to the size of the new formations. As a result the Front’s combat units, hospitals and supply bases suffered severe blows. The situation at hand required that FMNL reassess its strategy and make important changes in accord with the anticipated victory of the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua and that of Reagan in the US. The document states that FMNL’s leadership switched its strategic and tactical line and reverted to armed struggle conducted by small mobile squads. This change aided the suppression of the government armed forces’ offensive.