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Documents

August 31, 1962

Speech by Senator Keating, "Soviet Activities in Cuba"

Keating alleges that the Soviet Union is building "rocket installations" in Cuba and urges President Kennedy to take action.

July 20, 1988

Agreement between Angola, Cuba and South Africa, 'Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in Southwestern Africa'

Lays out the conditions for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Namibia, agreed on by Angola, Cuba, and South Africa.

1989

Defense Intelligence Agency Briefing, 'The 1987-88 Combat in Southern Angola: Lessons Learned'

Analysis of the military campaign waged in Southern Angola in 1987-88 as well as the lessons learned from this exchange. Document indicates that FAPLA failed to learn from its mistakes, while UNITA adapted much more effectively to the combat environment it faced in Angola. Although FAPLA managed to hold on to Cuito Cuanavale, its large losses led to a Cuban build-up in Southern Angola, which challenged the existing military balance in the region. This provided new impetus to peace negotiations and resulted in the December 1988 Accords among South Africa, Angola and Cuba.

August 13, 1963

Central Committee Bulgarian Communist Party Politburo Secret Resolution Regarding Arms Supply to Cuba

The Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party authorizes the creation of a Bulgarian delegation to negotiate a protocol on delivering “special equipment” (military arms/weapons) to Cuba in 1964. The Central Committee’s resolution includes a suggested amount of aid.

October 24, 1962

Chief of Staff, Bulgarian Navy, Order Regarding Naval Combat Readiness

The Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian Navy issued an order to prepare the Navy for mobilization, citing a Bulgarian government declaration about the Cuban missile crisis. The Chief of Staff's secret order includes 19 specific commands for preparation. Commands include orders regarding necessary supplies for combat readiness, repair schedules, deployment, arming vessels, radio communication, and increased surveillance, among others. The Chief of Staff order includes reporting requirements and specific dates for execution.

October 25, 1962

Cable from Dutch Embassy, Washington (Van Roijen), 25 October 1962

Van Roijen relates in this cable the details of a meeting with the US State Department's Bureau of Western European Affairs. With regards to Cuba, the Soviets assured the United States that they would not supply Cuba with offensive military weapons and even detailed the ranges of the missiles shipped. The construction of the bases was done in such haste that no attempt to conceal them was made, indicating the construction was on a time limit. These along with several other factors (the 1961 Berlin crisis, internal pressure within the Soviet Union) had convinced the administration that the Soviets had the fixed determination to confront the US.

May 24, 1962

R. Malinovsky and M. Zakharov, Memorandum on Deployment of Soviet Forces to Cuba

Zakharov and Malinovsky send to Khrushchev the Ministry of Defense’s proposal to send troops and supplies to Cuba. Zakharov and Malinovsky give further detail as to the nature of material to be sent to Cuba and a timetable for building launch pads and assembling missiles.

November 20, 1984

Information on Changes in the Strategic and Tactical Struggle of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMNL)

A description of measures taken by the military leadership of FMNL to improve the organized struggle in Central America, in terms of creating opportunities for large-scale operations intended to lead to the ultimate defeat of the enemy – the government-supported army of El Salvador. The information was compiled based on sources of the Vietnamese Embassy in Havana, and with the cooperation of the Cuban comrades. According to the document, a decision was made to regroup military units from small squads to battalions and brigades. Following this course, the partisan movements earned considerable success in 1984, but their actions easy to trace due to the size of the new formations. As a result the Front’s combat units, hospitals and supply bases suffered severe blows. The situation at hand required that FMNL reassess its strategy and make important changes in accord with the anticipated victory of the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua and that of Reagan in the US. The document states that FMNL’s leadership switched its strategic and tactical line and reverted to armed struggle conducted by small mobile squads. This change aided the suppression of the government armed forces’ offensive.