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1998

Interview with Robert W. Hultslander, Last CIA Station Chief in Luanda, Angola

CIA station chief in Luanda, Hultslander gives his perspective on the US involvement in Angola. In his interview he explains what the US knew about liberation movements prior to the outbreak of Civil War, his opinion on the CIA covert action program IAFEATURE, the Cuban presence in Angola and his assessment of the leading factions in Angola; MPLA, UNITA and FNLA.

November 27, 1975

Cable, Henry Kissinger, 'Angola: SAG Requests USG Provide FNLA/UNITA with Military Equipment'

Response to a request made by the South African Defense Forces Chief of Staff to supply UNITA/FNLA. The US believes that UNITA/FNLA are receiving sufficient support to meet their defensive needs.

June 27, 1975

US National Security Council Meeting Minutes on Angola

President Ford is briefed on the situation in Angola and requests possible options that the US could pursue to be made ready.

April 5, 1956

From the Journal of Ambassador P. F. Yudin, Record of Conversation with Mao Zedong, 31 March 1956

Soviet Ambassador Yudin discusses the 20th Congress of the CPSU with Mao, including Khrushchev's "secret speech" denouncing Stalin and his cult of personality. Mao had already seen a copy and discusses mistakes in Stalin's policy towards China at length.

March 30, 1983

CIA Report, 'New Information on South Africa’s Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear and Military Cooperation' (redacted)

CIA report summaries new information on Israel-South African nuclear cooperation. According to the report, South Africa formerly launched its weapons program in 1973, and paused it in 1979 following the international discovery of the Kalahari nuclear test site. Military cooperation between South Africa and Israel is believed to be extensive, with continual contact between personnel and the large-scale sale of arms. Aside from the South African sale of depleted uranium to Israel in the mid-1970s, the CIA had no hard evidence of nuclear cooperation between the two.

December 18, 1980

Memorandum from Chairman, Non-Proliferation Coordinating Committee James Malone, 'Recommendations for the Reagan Administration Non-Proliferation Policy'

James Malone writes to US Secretary of Energy designate James Edwards with recommendations from the Non-Prolifreation Coordinating Committee for the Reagan administration representing the views of nuclear industry groups.

December 11, 1980

Letter from US Naval Research Lab Director Alan Berman on Hydroacoustic Evidence on the Vela incident

Alan Berman writes to US Office of Science and Technology Policy senior advisor John Marcum on hydroacoustic evidence on the Vela incident. Based on sounds recorded, it appeared that a large explosion occurred south of Ascension Island.

January 21, 1979

US Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, 'The 22 September 1979 Event'

Forwarded to Ralph Earle, Director of US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on the 22 September 1979 explosion, or Vela Incident, concludes that it was a nuclear explosion.

November 9, 1989

Conversation between Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Solidarity Leader Lech Walesa

In this extraordinary conversation, Solidarity’s leader fears the collapse of the Wall would distract West Germany’s attention - and money - to the GDR, at the time when Poland, the trail-blazer to the post-communist era in Eastern Europe, desperately needed both. "Events are moving too fast," Walesa said, and only hours later, the Wall fell, and Kohl had to cut his Poland visit short to scramble back to Berlin, thus proving Walesa’s fear correct.

July 25, 1989

Report of the President of Hungary Rezso Nyers and General Secretary Karoly Grosz on Talks with Gorbachev in Moscow (excerpts)

President of People’s Republic of Hungary, Rezso Nyers, and General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Karoly Grosz, report on their talks with Gorbachev in Moscow, 24-25 July, 1989. The excerpts contains economic reformer Nyers’ assessment of the political situation in Hungary, and first among the factors that "can defeat the party," he lists "the past, if we let ourselves [be] smeared with it." The memory of the revolution of 1956 and its bloody repression by the Soviets was Banquo’s ghost, destroying the legitimacy of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, just as 1968 in Prague and 1981’s martial law in Poland and all the other Communist "blank spots" of history came back in 1989 to crumble Communist ideology. For their part, the Communist reformers (including Gorbachev) did not quite know how to respond as events accelerated in 1989, except not to repeat 1956.

Pagination