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Documents

December 2, 1962

Confidential Memo from Cuban Mission to the United Nations Concerning Anastas Mikoyan’s Conversations with US President John F. Kennedy (and Secretary of State Dean Rusk), with cover note from Cuban President Dorticos to Foreign Minister Roa

A report from the Cuban Mission to the UN concerning a conversation with Anastas Mikoyan and US President John F. Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. The three are mostly focused on discussing US-Latin American diplomatic relations, and concerns over American military presence in Latin America, specifically the US fly-overs. Kennedy continues to reiterate the US's position on 'no US invasion of Cuba.'

November 25, 1962

Letter from Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos to Fidel Castro re Conversation with Anastas Mikoyan

A letter from Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos regarding a conversation he had with Anastas Mikoyan. The two discussed mostly the USSR's position on Cuba, to which Mikoyan expressed the USSR's support of Cuba (that it would retaliate if Cuba were attacked), but that peaceful coexistence was still the Soviet's plan to follow for the development of humanity toward socialism and the defeat of imperialism.

November 20, 1962

Cable from Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa to Cuban Mission to the United Nations (Lechuga), New York

Instructions from Cuba's Foreign Minister, Roa, to Carlos Lechuga and the Cuban Mission to the UN on how they should handle presenting the Cuban points to the Brazilian proposal as amendments.

November 11, 1962

Cables from Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa to Cuban Mission to the United Nations (Lechuga), New York

A series of cables from the Cuban Foreign Minister, Roa, to Carlos Lechuga and the Cuban Mission to the UN. They discuss: a Cuban amendment to the Brazil proposal; U Thant’s idea of independent declaration in which each country would promise to uphold its corresponding part of the protocol; and opposition to inspections.

November 10, 1962

Cable from Cuban Foreign Minister Raúl Roa to Cuban Mission to the United Nations (Amb. Carlos M. Lechuga), New York

Cuban Foreign Minister, Raul Roa, sends a cable to Carlos Lechuga and the Cuban Mission to the UN discussing the "Yankee government" inspecting Soviet ships and instructing the Mission to await further instructions on the Brazil project.

October 22, 1962

Carlos Lechuga, Record of contacts at the UN Cuban Ambassador

Carlos Lechuga's record of contacts of the UN Cuban Ambassador from 22 October 1962 to 11 January 1963.

October 24, 1962

Record of Meeting of Fidel Castro and Military Chiefs

Fidel Castro and his military advisors are discussing possible American mobilization of troops to Cuba (in the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis) and what Cuba would need to do to defend itself from such an invasion. A majority of the conversation is devoted to anti-aircraft and aviation preparations.

November 16, 1962

Record of Conversation between Mikoyan and Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, Havana, 16 November 1962

The conversation takes place soon after the IL-28 crisis, which gives Mikoyan a chance to patch up the relationship with trade agreements and promises of future aid and industrial cooperation. Near the end of the conversation, Guevara and Mikoyan discuss the theory of revolutionary struggle. Guevara shares his vision that “further development of the revolutions in Latin America must follow the line of simultaneous explosions in all countries.” Mikoyan cautions him, pointing to the Soviet experience and using the metaphor of the rebellion on the battleship “Potemkin.” Hinting at further disagreement ahead, he gently registers his disagreement with the Cuban leader’s drive to ignite revolution in the hemisphere.

November 13, 1962

Record of Conversation between Mikoyan and Fidel Castro, Havana

The conversation was recorded after the Cuban leader refused to see the Soviet envoy for three days in a reaction to the new demand. Castro starts by declaring his disagreement with the decision to remove the IL-28s but, assures Mikoyan that the revolutionary leadership discussed the issue and agreed to the removal. Mikoyan presents all his arguments to show that the withdrawal of the planes would end the crisis and make the US non-invasion pledge more credible. He acknowledges the “negative psychological effect” of the decision and reiterates that all the rest of the weapons would stay in Cuba so its security would be guaranteed without the obsolete planes. They also agree on the rules of verification of the withdrawal.

November 11, 1962

Telegram from Nikita Khrushchev to Anastas Mikoyan

This telegram, written in Khrushchev's stream-of-consciousness style, outlines the rationale behind the decision to remove the missiles from Cuba that caused the crisis: It was much better to end the crisis by giving up planes that were already obsolete—to show that the Soviet Union and Cuba had fulfilled all the promises Khrushchev had given Kennedy—and consequently to expect, and demand, full compliance with the non-invasion pledge on the part of the United States, than to retain the planes and give the Americans a justification to violate their pledge. The telegram also spells out, in Khrushchev’s words, of the reasons why the weapons were deployed to Cuba in the first place.

Pagination