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July 2, 1957

Remarks of Senator John F. Kennedy in the Senate, Washington, D.C., July 2, 1957

On July 2, 1957, US senator John F. Kennedy made his perhaps best-known senatorial speech—on Algeria.

Home to about 8 million Muslims, 1.2 million European settlers, and 130,000 Jews, it was from October 1954 embroiled in what France dubbed “events”—domestic events, to be precise. Virtually all settlers and most metropolitan French saw Algeria as an indivisible part of France. Algeria had been integrated into metropolitan administrative structures in 1847, towards the end of a structurally if not intentionally genocidal pacification campaign; Algeria’s population dropped by half between 1830, when France invaded, and the early 1870s. Eighty years and many political turns later (see e.g. Messali Hadj’s 1927 speech in this collection), in 1954, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) launched a war for independence. Kennedy did not quite see eye to eye with the FLN.

As Kennedy's speech shows, he did not want France entirely out of North Africa. However, he had criticized French action already in early 1950s Indochina. And in 1957 he met with Abdelkader Chanderli (1915-1993), an unaccredited representative of the FLN at the United Nations in New York and in Washington, DC, and a linchpin of the FLN’s successful international offensive described in Matthew Connelly’s A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (2002). Thus, Kennedy supported the FLN’s demand for independence, which explains its very positive reaction to his speech.

And thus, unlike the 1952-1960 Republican administration of Dwight Eisenhower (1890-1969) that officially backed the views of NATO ally France and kept delivering arms, the Democratic senator diagnosed a “war” by “Western imperialism” that, together with if different from “Soviet imperialism,” is “the great enemy of … the most powerful single force in the world today: ... man's eternal desire to be free and independent.” (In fact, Kennedy’s speech on the Algerian example of Western imperialism was the first of two, the second concerning the Polish example of Sovietimperialism. On another, domestic note, to support African Algeria’s independence was an attempt to woe civil-rights-movement-era African Americans without enraging white voters.) To be sure, Kennedy saw France as an ally, too. But France’s war was tainting Washington too much, which helped Moscow. In Kennedy’s eyes, to support the US Cold War against the Soviet Union meant granting Algeria independence. The official French line was the exact opposite: only continued French presence in Algeria could keep Moscow and its Egyptian puppet, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, from controlling the Mediterranean and encroaching on Africa.

February 22, 1972

Memorandum of Conversation between Richard Nixon and Zhou Enlai

June 29, 1964

Cable from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, 'Premier Zhou Talked about the Relationship between China-Soviet Difference and the National Liberation Movement'

Account of Zhou's conversation with Kenyan officials, including discussions of the Sino-Soviet debate, imperialist manipulation of the debate, and enhanced US pressure in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

November 15, 1956

CDS Report No. 24 from Choi Duk Shin to the President (Syngman Rhee)

Choi Duk Shin offers his views on the crises in Hungary and the Middle East, urges President Rhee to organize immediate action against communist countries, and reports on Vietnamese domestic affairs including the recent typhoon and the continued Chinese minority debate.

April 24, 1963

Secret Telegram from Maneli (Saigon) to Spasowski (Warsaw) [Ciphergram No. 5295]

Report from Maneli, a Polish official in Saigon, to Warsaw, on the Indian opinion of the situation in Vietnam. According to him, the Indians believe the NLF to be finished and Diem's position to be strong, while they see Diem as the one lobbying for American withdrawal.

March 25, 1965

Conversation between Raul Castro Ruz, and a Member of the Polish Politburo, Zenon Kliszko

The conversation between Castro and Gomulka took place on the initiative of Castro. Parties discussed the following topics: (1) relations between the UPSR and the PUWP, (2) the issue of the legalization of the Cuban Revolution, (3) the Situation in Vietnam, (4) Cuba and the Current Situation in Latin America, (5) the position of the PUWP with regard to the conference of 81 parties, and (6) the attitude of the socialist camp towards Cuba.

December 2, 1964

Stasi Report on Meetings with the KGB, 30 November-1 December 1964

Meetings between KGB Chairman Semichastny and East German Minister for State Security Mielke. Topics of discussion include Lyndon B. Johnson's recent election in the United States, Khrushchev's ouster from the Kremlin, Sino-Soviet relation, and Khrushchev's son-in-law Alexei Adzhubei.

November 20, 1984

Information on Changes in the Strategic and Tactical Struggle of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMNL)

A description of measures taken by the military leadership of FMNL to improve the organized struggle in Central America, in terms of creating opportunities for large-scale operations intended to lead to the ultimate defeat of the enemy – the government-supported army of El Salvador. The information was compiled based on sources of the Vietnamese Embassy in Havana, and with the cooperation of the Cuban comrades. According to the document, a decision was made to regroup military units from small squads to battalions and brigades. Following this course, the partisan movements earned considerable success in 1984, but their actions easy to trace due to the size of the new formations. As a result the Front’s combat units, hospitals and supply bases suffered severe blows. The situation at hand required that FMNL reassess its strategy and make important changes in accord with the anticipated victory of the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua and that of Reagan in the US. The document states that FMNL’s leadership switched its strategic and tactical line and reverted to armed struggle conducted by small mobile squads. This change aided the suppression of the government armed forces’ offensive.