Memorandum highlighting recent developments in countries of Central Latin America. The information has been received from the Nicaraguan Ambassador to Bulgaria, after a visit to Budapest where he has met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nicaragua. The document summarizes political developments that have taken place in the following countries: El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.

Alekseev comments on the general attitude of the Cuban people in regards to the blockade and mobilization of the Cuban army

Head of the 1st Administration of the Ministry of the Interior Josef Houska reports a complaint by the Brazilian government regarding to Czechoslovak assistance of transporting guerrilla fighters from Cuba to Latin America. Brazilian government issued an official warning that relations between Brazil and Czechoslovak could be deteriorated in connection with the support for Cuba. Houska says Brazilian officials' argument could be proof that Czechoslovak specially selected officials making technical arrangement for the transits belong to some section of the Czechoslovak civil service. However, the Czechoslovak authorities cannot be blamed that they go along with the activities of the Cuban Embassy in Prague, which controls the transport of the guerrillas since an embassy is entitled to engage in full diplomatic activities in a friendly country. Houska argues that the Brazilian government does not have conceret evidence for the direct accusation of Czechoslovakia. The position of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs could have been the result of pressure by ultra-reactionary forces in domestic policy which are concerned by the opposition activities in Brazil and abroad.

Comrade Josef Houska submits a document concerning issues related to cooperation with the Cuban intelligence service especially the Operation MANUEL to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Operational MANUEL started in 1962 when the Cuban intelligence asked the Czechoslovak resident in Havana to arrange a transit through Prague for Venezuelan nationals who underwent guerrilla training in Cuba. In 1964 talks were held between Cuban and Czechoslovak intelligence services but no formal agreement of the tasks and responsibilities was concluded between the two. The Soviet government was informed about the Operation MANUEL and stated its agreement with the project. Houska says that the main objective of the operation is the education and training of revolutionary cadres from Latin America and the organization of combat groups. Participants of the operation were not confined to cadres from among the ranks of communist parties but also included members from various nationalist and anti-American groupings. The routes of individual participants in the operation were determined by the Cuban intelligence service who mainly directed the Operation MANUEL. Houska says problems that arisen in the course of the operation were solved in collaboration with Cuban and the Soviet authorities. The document cautioned about counter-espionage institutions' increasing interests in the operation and the fact that the US intelligence service agents were among the operation participants. Houska says refusal to offer assistance would have a negative impact on Cuba and Czechoslovakia would lose control over the operation.

Conversation for the record between Zhivkov and Castro during a four-day-long state visit of the Cuban leader to Bulgaria. Among the main issues discussed was the state of economic development in both countries, their relations with Albania, China, Romania and Yugoslavia; the Cuban foreign policy in Africa and the Caribbean; the civil war in Angola; the battle for the Third World.

The report introduces Czechoslovak's assistance in the Operation MANUEL after the isolation of socialist Castro regime. Cuba looked for alternative routes in Europe in order to promote and influence the revolutionary movement in Latin America. Czechoslovakia assistance in the operation is of a strictly technical nature and its intelligence service is doing its utmost to protect the interests of the country by securing all technical matters. The report says that terminating the assistance was not possible for both practical and political reasons-- all direct flights between Czechoslovakia and Cuba would be suspended and a drastic cooling off of relations between two governments. Czechoslovak's refusal in assisting the operation would be interpreted as a political decision to suspend assistance to the national liberation movement in Latin America countries. However, the reports says that the assistance of Czechoslovak intelligence service to the operation is in no way amounts to agreeing with its political content and constitutes a minor aspect of intelligence work. The Soviet intelligence was also involved in organizing the operation in Moscow and offered assistance to its Cuban counterpart.

Summary of recent developments in the formation of a unified leftist movement in Honduras lead by the country’s communist party, in an attempt to counter the “imperial” influence of the USA. The text suggests that various pro-communist movements within Central Latin America have formed, and have started to cooperate with the intent to create a network. The Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) have played most prominent role in this endeavor. The Honduras Communist party has worked internally in the direction of creating a strong consolidated left wing movement. The document mentions future plans for mutual cooperation between the Bulgarian Communist Party and the Honduras Communist Party.

A letter describing the state of socialist and communist movements in Latin America with respect to their organized struggle against the imperial influence of the US. The letter indicates that the growth of youth, workers' and women's movements in Latin America is conducive to the development of stronger ties with the socialist countries around the world. The letter suggests that a strategic approach towards Latin America should be adopted in establishing cooperation in all spheres of life: economic, political, and cultural. An emphasis is placed on the gradual development of close relations with Latin American communist parties.

Summary of main points discussed during Handal’s meetings with Alexander Lilov and Dimitar Stanishev regarding the political atmosphere in El Salvador and the revolutionary struggles in Latin America as a whole. Key topics include: the military and political operations of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMNL), the Summit of Central American Communist parties and revolutionary organizations held in Havana, and the problems encountered by the revolutionary movements in Latin America.

A description of measures taken by the military leadership of FMNL to improve the organized struggle in Central America, in terms of creating opportunities for large-scale operations intended to lead to the ultimate defeat of the enemy – the government-supported army of El Salvador. The information was compiled based on sources of the Vietnamese Embassy in Havana, and with the cooperation of the Cuban comrades. According to the document, a decision was made to regroup military units from small squads to battalions and brigades. Following this course, the partisan movements earned considerable success in 1984, but their actions easy to trace due to the size of the new formations. As a result the Front’s combat units, hospitals and supply bases suffered severe blows. The situation at hand required that FMNL reassess its strategy and make important changes in accord with the anticipated victory of the Sandinista movement in Nicaragua and that of Reagan in the US. The document states that FMNL’s leadership switched its strategic and tactical line and reverted to armed struggle conducted by small mobile squads. This change aided the suppression of the government armed forces’ offensive.