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October 22, 1997

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with Portuguese Prime Minister Guterres on 17 October 1997, 10 a.m. - 11.15 a.m.

Kohl and Guterres look into Portugal's EC presidency and the question of EC enlargement. They agree to start formal negotiations on enlargement in early 1998 as planned. Guterres stresses that Portugal would be a major victim of enlargement as it would lose out in all areas.

May 12, 1997

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev on Saturday, 10 May 1997, 2.30 p.m. - 3.45 p.m. in Almaty

Kohl and Nazarbaev dissus a variety of issues including Russia, China, NATO enlargement and the domestic situation in Iran against the backdrop of the end of Rafsandjani's tenure in 1997. Kohl reiterates his willingness to engage Iran. At the same time, he stresses the need for Iran to move first in order to show goodwill.

April 23, 1997

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin on 17 April 1997 in Baden-Baden

Kohl and Yeltsin talk about the convocation of regular German-Russian summits including their relevant ministers. They review Yeltsin's meeting with Clinton in Helsinki on NATO enlargmement in March 1997 when Yeltsin gave his consent to the conclusion of a NATO-Russia partnership treaty based on the condition that NATO would not deploy nuclear armaments and permanent conventional forces in its new member states. Kohl points to the long-term perspective and the importance of concluding the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

September 12, 1996

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Telephone Conversation with Polish President Kwasniewski on Thursday, 12 September 1996, 9.30 hours

Kohl and Kwasniewski exchange thoughts on the state of Yeltsin's health. They agree that NATO must not pursue further steps in the enlargement process during the period of Yeltsin's illness after his  coronary bypass surgery. Finally, Kohl and Kwasniewski look into the timetable for NATO enlargement and the decision about its new members at the July 1997 NATO summit in Madrid.

February 26, 1996

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meetings with President Yeltsin in Moscow (18 - 20 February 1996) here: Chancellor’s Conversation with President Yeltsin on 19 February 1996

Kohl and Yeltsin discuss the need for an end to the war in Chechnya prior to the 1996 Presidential election in Russia. Yeltsin criticizes the sharp position of the German media in terms of the Chechnya War. With regards to NATO enlargement and the NATO-Russia partnership, Kohl and Yeltsin agree to search for a solution after the Russian Presidential election.

February 22, 1996

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Primakov on 19 February 1996 in Moscow (16.45 - 17.30 hours)

Kohl and Primakov debate NATO enlargement. Primakov reiterates the broad societal consensus against NATO enlargement in Russia. Kohl stresses that there was Western agreement in terms of the need for Russia's continued inclusion in international affairs.

January 10, 1996

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with the President of the Polish Republic, Mister Alexander Kwasniewski on 9 January 1996 at the Chancellor’s Office

Kohl refers to the Franco-German relationship as a role model for Germany’s relationship with Poland. Kwasniewski looks into Poland's domestic reform agenda stressing the importance of further expanding Poland's ties with NATO and the EC.

July 14, 1959

Notice from First Secretary Eoin MacWhite To All Irish Diplomatic Missions (Except Washington)

First Secretary Eoin MacWhite informed all missions of Aiken’s concerns that U.S. nuclear information agreements with selected NATO partners could impede efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. He was nonetheless reticent when it came to lodging a formal protest, having been advised by Eoin MacWhite that a strong denunciation would be counterproductive. From MacWhite’s reading no actual nuclear information would be transferred to Allied personnel after all. The agreements related specifically to information necessary for the training of Allied personnel in the employment of U.S. atomic weapons in their hosts’ territories, so Aiken recoiled from further diplomatic protests. He appreciated the need to maintain some nuance on nuclear sharing as he pursued an East-West consensus. 

The strength of NATO's feelings in favor of enhanced alliance nuclear defense and cooperation in the aftermath of the Sputnik shock was well known. The Irish were aware of the Eastern bloc’s objections to NATO nuclear sharing as a dangerous precedent that strengthened NATO’s political and security position. Moscow was especially exercised by any prospect of West German access to nuclear weapons as part of the normalization of German rearmament and progress toward reunification. Moscow opposed any semblance of Bonn’s finger on the nuclear trigger, or its troops gaining proficiency with nuclear weaponry. 

May 11, 1995

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Conversation with Russian President Yeltsin on 9 May 1995 in Moscow

Kohl and Yeltsin discucss the parallelism between NATO enlargement and Russia's engagement and the timing of NATO enlargement in particular. Yeltsin expresses his disappointment about the lack of progress in the U.S.-Russian talks on the issue complaining that the "the West was about to relapse into the thinking of military blocs prior to 1990. This was not acceptable," Yeltsin says. Moreover, Kohl and Yeltsin discuss Russian sales of nuclear power plants for Iran.

March 31, 1995

The Chancellor's [Helmut Kohl's] Meeting with Polish President Walesa in Copenhagen on 11 March 1995

Kohl and Walesa examine the state of NATO enlargement and EC enlargement. Walesa sees EC enlargment first and foremost as an economic process that would take longer. The decision for NATO enlargement could be taken faster, Walesa argues. Kohl reiterates the necessity of a "face-saving" solution for Russia short of giving Russia a veto over NATO enlargement.

Pagination